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4K Čtyřkoalice Four Coalition (KDU-ČSL, US, DEU, 
ODA)
ČSL Československá strana lidová Czechoslovak People’s Party
ČSS Československá strana socialistická Czechoslovak Socialist Party
ČSSD Česká strana sociálně demokratická Czech Social Democratic Party
DEU Demokratická unie Democratic Union
HSD-SMS Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii - 
Společnost pro Moravu a Slezsko
Movement for Self-Governing Democracy - 
Society for Moravia and Silesia
KDS Křesťanskodemokratická strana Christian Democratic Party
KDU-ČSL Křesťanska a demokratická unie - 
Československá strana lidová
Christian Democratic Union -  
Czechoslovak People’s Party
KSČ Komunistická strana Československa Communist Party of Czechoslovakia
KSČM Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia
MOH Moravské občanské hnutí Moravian Civic Movement
ODA Občanská demokratická aliance Civic Democratic Alliance
ODS Občanská demokratická strana Civic Democratic Party
OF Občanské fórum Civic Forum
OH Občanské hnutí Civic Movement
SMV Strana moravského venkova Party of the Moravian Countryside
SNK Sdružení nezávislých kandidátů Association of Independent Candidates
SNK-ED Sdružení nezávislých kandidátů - 
Evropští demokraté
Association of Independent Candidates - 
European Democrats
SPR-RSČ Sdružení pro republiku - Republikánská 
strana Československa
Association for the Republic - Republican 
Party of Czechoslovakia
SZ Strana zelených Green Party
US Unie svobody Freedom Union
US-DEU Unie svobody - Demokratická unie Freedom Union - Democratic Union




ANO Aliancia nového občana Alliance of the New Citizen
DS Demokratická strana Democratic Party
DÚ Demokratická únia Slovenska Democratic Union of Slovakia
HZD Hnutie za demokraciu Movement for Democracy
HZDS Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko Movement for a Democratic Slovakia
KDH Křesťanskodemokratické hnutie Christian Democratic Movement
KSS Komunistická strana Slovenska Communist Party of Slovakia
ĽS-HZDS Ľudová strana - Hnutie za demokratické People’s Party - Movement for a 
Slovensko Democratic Slovakia
MKDH Maďarské křestanskodemokratické Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement
hnutie
MNI Maďarská nezávislá iniciativa Hungarian Independent Initiative
MPP-MOS Magyar Polgári Part - Maďarská Hungarian Civic Party
občianska strana
ODU Občianska demokratická únia Civic Democratic Union
RSS Roľnická strana Slovenska Peasants’ Party of Slovakia
SDA Sociálne-demokratická alternatíva Social Democratic Alternative
SDK Slovenská demokratická koalícia Slovak Democratic Coalition
SDKÚ Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská Slovak Democratic and Christian Union
únia
SDĽ Strana demokratickej ľavice Party of the Democratic Left
SDSS Sociálne-demokratická strana Slovenska Slovak Social Democratic Party
SF Slobodne fórum Free Forum
Smer Smer Direction
SMK Strana maďarskej koalície Party of Hungarian Coalition
SNS Slovenská národná strana Slovak National Party
SOP Strana občianského porozumenia Party of Civic Understanding
SZS Strana zelených na Slovensku Green Party of Slovakia
VPN Verejnosť proti násiliu Public Against Violence
ZRS Združenie robotníkov Slovenska Association of Slovak Workers
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I. Introduction
The transition to democracy and consolidation of democracy in Central and 
Eastern Europe is a widely debated topic within the study of comparative politics. Nearly 
twenty years after embarking on the democratization and economic liberalization path, 
most of these states have emerged with stable and internationally accepted democratic 
systems. The literature on democratization has identified many different factors that 
contribute to the success of democracy (its stabilization and consolidation) in post­
communist states. One of the crucial factors in the development of democracy is 
institution-building. New democratic states must rapidly and decisively put democratic 
institutions in place in order to be able to carry out the procedures related to democracy. 
Institutions include not only the governing bodies, but also political parties, which form 
the basis of political competition. The development and maintenance of political parties 
is crucial to newly-formed democracies, and the ability of parties to win elections, 
survive, and adapt is one important indicator of the successful functioning of democracy.
Studies of newly-formed or renewed political parties and political party systems 
focus on the contexts and conditions for their development, incorporating a variety of 
variables that account for differences in their consolidation and institutionalization. Hand 
in hand with the institutionalization of political parties is the establishment or 
stabilization of a party system, defined as the patterned interactions (competition and 
cooperation) between different parties in a system. While it has been argued that the term 
“party system” should be used only in cases when patterned interactions are established 
(Mair 1997), I take a looser understanding of the term, and will seek to evaluate whether 
the party systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics have stabilized and consolidated. 
Many different factors have been identified as connected specific structure of the party 
system: historical legacies, previous regime types, type of democratic governmental 
system, electoral structure and law, as well as the parties themselves.
Political parties are considered of the utmost importance to democracy in many 
post-communist states. This is reflected even in the post-communist constitutions with 
the “constitutional anchoring” of political parties in the Czech Republic (Šimíček 2003). 
Article 5 of the 1993 Czech constitution states “The political system is based on the free 
and voluntary foundation and free competition of political parties...” Similarly, the
Slovak constitution guarantees the autonomy of political parties and citizens’ 
participation in them: “Citizens have the right to establish political parties and political 
movements and to associate in them. ... Political parties and political movements, as well 
as clubs, societies, and other associations are separated from the state” (Article 29, 
Sections 2 and 4). Thus, not only do political theorists consider parties necessary for the 
development, but so do the lawmakers and institution-builders within the states in 
question. Thus parties offer themselves as an important aspect of democratization to be 
examined and analyzed.
While many studies of party systems are quite broad and include many different 
countries over a given period of time, this study will be more limited in its scope. I will 
focus on political party systems and their development in two Central European states 
during the post-communist era. The two states chosen are the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, successor states to the former Czechoslovakia. These states have been chosen 
because, despite their similarity in many political and historical aspects, and their shared 
statehood under communism, and during the early years of transition, there are some 
important differences in the development of their political systems after 1989.
This study will attempt to describe and analyze the development of the political 
party system in the post-communist Czech and Slovak Republics after 1989. I will rely 
on comparative analysis as a method of comparing the different development of the party 
systems in the two states. Both qualitative and quantitative data from primary and 
secondary sources will be employed. The structure of the paper should be arranged along 
temporal lines, describing and comparing the development of each party system in 
several stages. These stages are:
A. The communist era of hegemonic party rule, included to help demonstrate 
possible legacies of the communist “party system”;
B. The formation of opposition coalitions and their success in the first post­
communist elections;
C. The breakup of these large coalitions into smaller parties: this section will 
include an overview of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia;
D. The “turning point” 1998 elections: marked by struggle within and among the 
parties in both countries;
9
E. The final stage covers the two most recent electoral periods: 1998-2002 and 
2002 until just before the 2006 elections;
Sections B, C, and E will include evaluations of the party systems including attempts at 
classifications following Sartori’s (1976) model. I will also analyze the behavior and 
interactions of the individual parties with the goal of classifying them along ideological 
and behavioral models discussed in the section on theory. The final section will also 
include some prospects for the future of the Czech and Slovak party systems. Another 
section after the time-period analyses will focus specifically on the development of a 
phenomenon unique to post-communist party systems: communist successor parties. 
This section will be devoted to the description and analysis of the different development 
and roles of the KSČM in the Czech Republic, and the SDĽ in Slovakia.
At a time when studies of democratic transition are moving away from the Central 
and Eastern European region, this project brings light to the fact that while countries like 
the Czech and Slovak Republics are widely considered success-stories in 
democratization, there are still unresolved issues and important developments that need to 
be made. Particularly with regards to Slovakia, this analysis will show that consolidation 
of the party system has not happened, even after 16 years of democratization. On the 
other hand, the applicability to the Czech system of models built on Western European 
cases helps solidify the argument that its party system has stabilized and consolidated.
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II. Theory and Methodology
A. Democratization and Consolidation
The so-called “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991), starting with 
Southern Europe and Latin American and perhaps encompassing the post-communist 
European countries has caused a great debate within comparative politics as to how 
democracy can be defined. One of the first and most widely used definitions is the 
minimalist definition as outlined first by Joseph Schumpeter and later by Dahl. The 
minimalist or procedural definition requires seven major conditions for a governing 
regime to be considered a democracy: 1. control over governmental decisions exercised 
by elected officials, 2. frequent and fair elections without corruption or violence, 3. 
universal suffrage (or near universal), 4. the freedom to run for political office, 5. free 
expression of opinion, 6. available alternate sources of information (aside from 
government-controlled sources), and 7. the freedom to form independent associations 
(Dahl 1971). While some, like Huntington (1991), view democracy as a dichotomous 
matter—either a country is democratic or not— others have proposed numerous “types” 
of democracy that can exist.1
Given the vast number of “definitions” of democracy that exists, determining 
whether a country in transition has become a democracy is a daunting task. The process 
of democratization seen from an institutional perspective has three basic stages: the fall 
of the non-democratic regime, the building of democratic institutions, and the 
consolidation of those institutions. The institutions crucial to democracy include not only 
the government, parliament, bureaucracy and legal system, but also the system of free 
political competition, based in most democracies on political parties. Merely setting up 
these institutions does not create a stable, consolidated democracy. They must be 
consolidated: in other words, the major players in the democratic must accept the shape 
and roles of the institution and agree to “play by the rules of the game.”
Linz and Stepan (1996, 14) set out five major areas of a modem consolidated 
democracy: civil society, political society, rule of law, state apparatus, and economic
1 This has led to the spawning of over 500 different “types” o f democracy, leading to confusion within the 
field. See Collier and Levitsky (1996) for an overview of the many types o f democracy and suggestions for 
streamlining the categorization of democracy in future research.
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society. This paper will deal with particularly with the second area: political society. 
The consolidation of political society includes the institutionalization of political parties 
as well as the consolidation and stabilization of the political party system. Political 
parties and their development must be distinguished from the party system and its 
development. Studies of individual parties focus on their organization, structure, 
behavior and ability to represent a given electorate, while studies o f party systems look at 
how the parties in a given country interact, compete, and cooperate. The party system 
cannot be equated with the number of parties, but rather consists of: “patterns of 
competition and cooperation between different parties in that system” (Ware 1999, 7). 
Following Sartori (1976), I take the party system to be greater than the sum of its parts— 
more than just the actions and behavior of the parties. This makes the “measurement” of 
party systems and its operationalization somewhat difficult. I will follow the established 
theory of party systems. A following section will outline different variables that must be 
examined in classifying a party system.
B. Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation
Political parties form the basis of democratic competition in most contemporary 
democracies. While many theorists expand on the decline of political parties in Western 
Europe, for the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, parties remain extremely 
important actors in the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Millard contends: 
“In the circumstances of post-communism, where alternative mechanisms of 
representation such as pressure groups remained undeveloped or ill-linked to national 
decision-making processes, parties were virtually the sole agents of representation” 
(2004, 3). Therefore, analyzing the party system in a given country can help evaluations 
of the processes of democratization and consolidation. For this reason, the nature of 
political parties and party systems or aspects of them are considered in a wide range of 
theories and models regarding the evaluation of consolidated democracies. A stable party 
system is a necessary, though by no means sufficient condition for a consolidated 
democracy.
While the debate over the normative evaluation is quite diverse and there is little 
consensus over the type of party system that is most ideal or supportive of democracy,
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some conclusions are generally agreed upon regarding the structure of party systems. An 
excessive number of parties is considered to be disadvantageous for the consolidation of 
democracy, since the presence of many parties often indicates weak ties to the electorate 
and high volatility. Volatility in the party system—the frequent splitting, forming, and 
disappearing of political parties—makes consolidation of the electoral system difficult. 
The reason is twofold. First, parties are supposed to be vehicles of representation within 
the system and a key part of representation is accountability. When parties are likely to 
disappear or from the scene after one or two elections, voters are unable to hold them 
accountable. Frequent splitting and formation of new parties also decreases the amount 
of accountability. If the incumbent no longer exists, it is difficult for the voters to 
“punish” them with votes for the opposition or another party. Secondly, high volatility in 
the party system decreases overall commitment of both politicians and voters to specific 
parties (Birch 2003, 120).
Two further aspects of a consolidated party system are important. One is the 
ideological structure—the positions that various parties occupy on a right-left spectrum, 
and the distances between them. While there is no formula for an ideal ideological 
structure of a party system, extremely large distances between the parties can make 
competition quite difficult. Similarly, the inability or unwillingness of certain parties to 
identify their ideological orientation can inhibit other parties from settling into a position, 
and in turn, an electorate. Furthermore, the presence of parties whose orientations do not 
support or is openly hostile to the democratic regime can also threaten democratic 
stability with the possibility of a return to non-democracy (Dawisha and Parrot 1997, 18).
These four aspects of party systems: number of parties, the presence of anti­
system parties, and volatility in the party system, have important implications for the 
consolidation of the party system and in turn of democracy. The next section will outline 
my approach to the classification of party systems and the variables that are crucial to 
their analysis.
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C. Categorizing Party Systems
Major Variables
The study of political party systems depends in large part on the various ways in 
which the systems are classified. At the most basic level, one can identify two types of 
systems based on the presence or absence of competition. Democratic theory calls for 
free and competitive elections as an essential foundation of democracy. Systems that 
fall under totalitarian, authoritarian, and other non-democratic regime types may have 
political party systems, but cannot be considered competitive. Non-competitive regimes 
can be either single-party systems, in which only one party is allowed to exist; or 
hegemonic party systems, which have more parties, but one which dominates over the 
others and controls the political system. Among competitive political systems, there can 
be one-party systems (several parties exist, but a single party almost always successfully 
wins elections, i.e., Japan), two-party systems (i.e. the US), and multi-party systems 
which characterize much of Western Europe and the emerging democracies of Central 
and Eastern Europe. Both competitive and non-competitive party systems are relevant 
for this study, as I will briefly analyze the Czechoslovak communist regime, which 
qualifies as a hegemonic party system, and the democratic regime that has emerged since
1989 as a multi-party system.
Several variables are central to the study of party systems. Following and 
expanding upon Sartori’s (1976) theory of party systems, Ware (1999, 150-75) 
recognizes four major variables, which have been outlined in the previous section: 
number and relative strength of parties, party penetration of society, ideological 
placement, and stance of parties towards the legitimacy of the regime. The first variable 
is the number of political parties in society. Before categorizing the system, it must first 
be decided which parties are indeed relevant to the system. In this case, Sartori proposes 
that parties must either have “coalition potential” or “blackmail potential”2 to be 
considered relevant. Once the relevant parties have been determined, systems are divided 
into two-party and multi-party. However, some suggest that this variable should also
2 Coalition potential, as the name suggests, means that it either has enough support to lead elections and 
form a coalition, or is acceptable by other parties (even rivals) as a potential coalition partner. Parties with 
blackmail potential, on the other hand, are not considered acceptable coalition partners (often they are anti­
system parties), but still have some power or enough support to affect what coalition-parties can do.
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take into account the relative size of parties. In this case, the “multi-party” category is 
divided into several different pictures depending on the relative strength of the parties in 
parliament. These are: “two-and-a-half party systems; systems with one large party and 
several much smaller ones; systems with two larger parties and several much smaller 
ones; even multiparty systems” (Ware 1999, 163).
A second axis of comparison for party systems is the ideological placement of 
parties. For individual parties, ideological categorization can be important, and at the 
system level, the combination of ideologies represented among political parties is 
important as it can structure the nature of competition. While valid for Western 
European parties, where the traditional left-right axis or party families hold true, this axis 
is more problematic for newly emerging and unstable political systems, both because 
parties do not have historical roots identifying them with particular ideologies and 
because individuals are somewhat less likely to identify along ideological lines. For this 
study, ideology is relevant in the case of the Czech Republic, but will be more 
problematic for the case of the Slovak Republic (more on this below).
The third variable, somewhat related to ideology, is the stance of parties towards 
the legitimacy of the regime. This deals with the existence and importance of anti-system 
parties, on both the left and right. “Anti-system parties” are those which do not “accept 
fully the rules of the liberal democratic political game” and might attempt to change the 
system or some of its basic foundations if in power. Although some anti-system parties 
do not receive significant support, there are quite a few cases where they receive enough 
support to become relevant as “blackmail parties,” though they rarely develop coalition 
potential without significant reform.
The final variable is the extent to which political parties are able to penetrate 
society. While some political cultures operate on the basis of very loose ties between 
parties and voters, others have parties as an important focal point of life, even outside of 
politics. Generally, in societies where there is less penetration of parties, there are more 
possibilities for new parties to emerge. This has been the case with post-communist 
countries in which nearly all parties are new and thus have low ties with the public, and 
in turn the public is distrustful of parties. Party penetration of society can be measured
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by individuals’ identification with parties or membership, involvement in party-related 
organization, and general attitudes (indifference, trust, etc.) towards political parties.
Sartori ’s Model o f Classification
In his seminal work on political parties and systems, Sartori focuses on two major 
axes of comparison: party fragmentation and ideological distance. The former includes 
the above mentioned number and relative size of the parties in parliament, and the latter 
focuses mainly on the left-right spectrum (in Ware 1999, 168). In considering 
competition and ideological difference, not only are the positions, but also the direction 
in which competition pulls the party’s ideological stances are important. The direction 
can either be “centripetal” (pulling towards the center) or “centrifugal” pulling parties 
away from the center. As the left-right spectrum is not always explicitly useful for the 
two case studies at hand, I will supplement the ideological distance variable with other 
indicators, especially those used by Slovak political scientists (Szomolányi, Mesežnikov, 
and others) of “standard” and “non-standard” parties to describe the type of competition 
characteristic of the Slovak political system. Nevertheless, when applicable, especially in 
the most recent electoral periods, I will analyze the party systems using the variables 
outlined by Ware, but for the sake of parsimony, I will classify the systems according to 
Sartori’s simplified schema [see Figure A], when applicable. Using models developed 
specifically with Western European systems in mind has downfalls, but the creation of 
additional models is unnecessary and does not provide as much in the way of comparison 
with existing party systems. With this in mind, it will be helpful to outline the ways in 
which party systems of post-communist states can be expected to differ from the 
traditional Western European models.
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Figure A: Sartori’s Model of Party System Classification (simplified)
Ideological distance 
SMALL H|GH
Differences o f Post-Communist Party Systems
Peter Mair (1997) argues that the case of party systems in post-communist states 
are different than Western Europe for several reasons. The first is the timing of the 
emergence of the party system vis-á-vis democratization. Unlike in Western Europe, 
where cleavages and then political parties developed over decades before universal 
suffrage brought full democracy, post-communist states experienced the transformation 
to democracy before political parties could be created. Thus the party system has not had 
time to develop stable roots and freezing is unlikely. Secondly, the electorate in post­
communist polities is much less stable, as identities and social structures are not well- 
aligned; parties are generally top-down organizations with low membership. Because all 
parties are new, much more splitting and factionalization occurs in post-communist party 
systems than among the established and well-disciplined Western European parties. 
Finally, party competition itself is quite unstable, creating a situation in which parties are 
unable to predict their likely victories (or defeats) and thus are not motivated to 
compromise or target narrower electorates.
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D. Party System Development
In addition to classifying party systems according to the aforementioned schema, 
the study of emerging party systems must include analysis of how the systems developed 
and the factors which influence their development. The factors that will be examined 
here include: historical context, type of regime change, number of and space between 
cleavages in society, and the electoral system.
Historical Context and Path Dependency
The democratization process in the post-communist states in Central and Eastern 
Europe provided a new impetus for the study of party and party system development. 
Much of the research emphasizes the importance of historical experience and its 
influence on political developments in the new democracies. Party systems (like other 
aspects of the political system) are often described as path-dependent, as actors are 
constrained in part by their countries’ and their own experiences (Pennings and Lane 
1998; Kitschelt, et.al. 1999; Linz and Stepan 1996).
Dawisha and Parrot (1997), among others, have argued for the analysis of pre­
communist political and democratic structures in the study of post-communist regimes. 
They argue that the “popular memory” of pre-communist democracy can be an important 
factor both in the establishment of democracy and in the modeling of its institutions. The 
correlation between the strength of democracy before communism and the success of 
democracy in the post-communist era does not necessarily indicate causality. The 
importance of pre-communist legacies in this respect has been exaggerated. Pre­
communist political structures are important in the cases of a few revival parties (such as 
the Czech Social Democrats and Christian Democrats) and in determining the structure of 
some aspects of the system, but the role of “popular memory” is mostly limited to 
rhetoric, and other factors much more greatly influence the outcome of post-communist 
democratization.
Kitschelt, et.al. (1999) have outlined a much more convincing way in which the 
pre-communist social and political structures matter. The character of pre-communist 
society and politics was influential for what type of communist regime would be
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installed. Because of the path-dependent constraints upon actors, the style of communist 
rule affected the type of regime change and therefore the process of transformation and 
its likely success. The authors provide extensive evidence of the constraints placed on 
post-communist regimes by the nature of both the precommunist and communist regimes. 
It would be redundant to restate these arguments. However, I do include a brief 
discussion of the party system under communist rule, both to provide a frame for 
comparison with post-communist rule and to highlight the changes that took place, 
especially in the early years of the transformation.
Type o f Regime Change
While the systematic relation between non-democratic regime type and paths of 
regime change is still a subject of debate among scholars, in individual cases it can 
provide important explanations regarding the paths available to the leaders of the 
democratic opposition. In their study of democratic transition in Southern Europe, South 
America and CEE, Linz and Stepan (1996) view the type of pre-democratic regime as 
important in determining which paths of regime change are possible. For each non- 
democratic regime type (authoritarian, totalitarian, post-totalitarian, and sultanistic), only 
some paths of transition are possible. The independent variables include the nature of the 
non-democratic leadership, the democratic opposition, state institutions (bureaucracy, 
military, law, etc.). In the case of (“frozen”) post-totalitarian regimes such as that in 
Czechoslovakia, the likely paths of regime change, according to Linz and Stepan, are: 
“reforma-pactada, ruptura-pactada,” interim government after the collapse of the regime, 
collapse and takeover by non-democratic forces, or collapse supported by an external 
hegemon (57-59).
Kitschelt, et.al. (1999) specify four general types of regime change, and identify 
each of three categories of communist rule (bureaucratic-authoritarian, national- 
accomodative, and patrimonial) with one of the types of regime change.3 For countries 
with a bureaucratic-authoritarian communist regime (Czechoslovakia), the leadership of 
the regime holds on to power as long as possible, while opposition forces organize
3 The fourth type of regime change, revolution, does not find a place in the transitions of Central and 
Eastern Europe and is thus excluded from the discussion.
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underground until “the international situation becomes sufficiently favorable to wipe out 
the incumbent regime almost instantly” (31). This path of regime change is referred to as 
implosion, breakdown, replacement, or collapse in the transition literature. Particularly 
with regard to Czechoslovakia, the “domino effect” of the downfall of communist 
regimes in the rest of Europe created a favorable context for the implosion of the 
Czechoslovak regime.
The authors go on to sketch the likely course of developments after the collapse of 
the regime. Because the democratic opposition had been previously suppressed, the 
leaders of the new systems have little recognition with the public, and thus are more 
likely to support a democratic system that does not emphasize personality (proportional 
representation, parliamentary executive). “A rational logic underlies institutional choice” 
(Kitschelt, et.al. 1999,32). These tendencies are not certain, however. While the authors 
argue that type of regime change certainly has some impact over the nature of the post­
communist regime that emerges, a given path of regime change does not necessarily 
cause a given type of post-communist regime. The collapse of the communist regime 
means that former communists were unwilling to reform and thus the likelihood of 
renewed authoritarianism (as in Bulgaria) is unlikely. However constrained they are by 
path-dependency and the nature of the previous regime, there are always several choices 
open to the post-communist elites. This is the case in the two republics of the former 
Czechoslovakia: “ ...the collapse of the old regime left the shaping of the future in the 
hands of oppositionist politicians, but...the trajectories of the two republics diverged 
sharply” (Gill 2002, 40).
Number o f and Space between “Cleavages ” in Society
One of the leading theories in the study of political party systems and their 
changes has been the work of Lipset and Rokkan (1967) which postulates that party 
systems in Western Europe are “frozen” along the deeply rooted socio-political divisions 
(cleavages) formed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries and well established by the 
1920s. The main cleavages are: center-periphery, state-church, land-industry, and 
owners-workers. The first two emerged with the various national revolutions and the 
latter two with the industrial revolution of the 19th century. The competing interests
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represented in the cleavage structure gradually politicized and transformed into political 
party alignments. Since the political crystallization of the cleavage structures, there has 
been little (need for) change of the political structure.
Pennings and Lane (1998) have compiled arguments from various scholars 
maintaining that party systems have actually changed and developed in Western, 
Southern and Eastern Europe, and that the cleavage structures hypothesis is outdated. 
They argue that party system change, defined as alterations in the “competitive or 
cooperative relationships between parties in the electoral, parliamentary, or governmental 
arena,” is evident particularly because the cleavage structures are no longer stable and 
deeply rooted, and are often “engineered” using short-term interests (ibid. 3, 13). Their 
volume uses other indicators and properties of party systems, including: volatility 
between elections, ideological polarization, effective number of parties and 
fractionalization, and lack of proportionality between votes and seats {ibid., 5).
While the “freezing” aspect of Lipset and Rokkan’s hypothesis is not entirely 
applicable to CEE countries, the idea of cleavage structures may in fact be relevant. 
Comparative theorists have found the cleavage structure to be a useful starting point for 
the study of emerging political party systems. Kitschelt, et.al. (1999) have reworked the 
specific cleavage structure to fit the case of post-communist Central and Eastern Europe. 
This new structure of divides includes: social protectionist-liberal (economic), social 
libertarian-authoritarian, national closure-cosmopolitan opening, divides among ethnic 
groups, and supporters-opponents of the old (communist) regime. The authors note that 
the above should be considered as divides or dimensions which are transient, rather than 
cleavages which are more durable. Divides tend to become cleavages if they can be 
associated with socio-political or demographic groups (ibid. 64-9).
Neither in Western Europe nor in CEE do cleavages within a given polity 
necessarily or automatically develop into politicized debates or political parties. Jakub 
Zielinksi explores the formation of cleavages using game theory, and finds that coalition 
formation among actors in a political system affects the development of certain divisions 
into politicized cleavages and thus parties. As Zielinski (2001) warns, new party systems 
are able to develop into a diverse arrive of structures. Furthermore, a system with a given 
cleavage structure could end up with one of several possible party system outcomes.
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Thus, while identifying cleavages within a society is important and can help to frame the 
development of a party system, the formation of political parties along every cleavage 
line in a given society does not always occur.
Thus the cleavage structure theory can be valuable even for unstable and 
developing post-communist regimes. The party system variable to which it most relates is 
that of ideologies of parties, however, it can also have implications for the number of 
relevant parties that develop within a system. A society with numerous and exclusive 
groups can be expected to have more parties which develop along these lines (Dawisha 
and Parrot 1997). This is especially true of ethnic cleavages in post-communist states. 
The redefined cleavage structure presented by Kitschelt, et.al. is the most useful 
characterization of the divisions in post-communist societies. Divisions do not naturally 
crystallize into political parties, but their existence can help explain the development of 
certain parties in the post-communist context.
Electoral System Type and Changes
Aside from historical experience and the social structure, the type of electoral 
system chosen by the new leaders is an important determinant of the structure of the party 
system. It has particular importance for states emerging from single-party or hegemonic- 
party rule: “Electoral institutions were also the principal means used to manage the 
dismantling of the monopolistic parties that had served as the main engines and 
structuring devices of the communist socio-political and economic systems” (Birch 2003, 
8). Furthermore, given the instability of developing democracies, changes or 
amendments of the system are much more likely, further affecting the parties and the 
party system. The study of electoral systems is a discipline in itself and involves much 
more in-depth analysis of electoral law than is possible within the scope of this project.4 
Nevertheless, several major variables in the type of electoral system have been important 
in the development of the political systems in Central and Eastern Europe and in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics particularly.
The two primary institutional choices that must be made are the choice between 
presidential and parliamentary systems of government and majoritarian and proportional
4 For a study on the effects o f electoral design in post-communist Europe, see Birch (2003).
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systems of representation. In post-communist Europe, parliamentary systems have been 
overwhelmingly favored over presidential systems (only Russia and Ukraine have chosen 
the latter) and both the Czech and Slovak Republic employ versions of proportional 
representation to elect the legislature. Therefore, in the context of this study, these need 
not be considered variables explaining differences in the party systems or their 
development. However, in the context of the initial institutional choice and attempts to 
change the system, the type of system is important, as they have consequences for the 
structure of the system. Parliamentary systems have been identified as “party- 
strengthening” (Millard 2004) as opposed to presidential systems, because parliamentary 
elections do not regularly produce an absolute majority, and thus often require coalition 
governments and some form of power-sharing (Linz 1990). Proportional representation 
systems are also identified with multi-party systems, and can minimize the bias towards 
large parties (Duverger 1954, Riker 1982). Thus attempts by major parties to shift away 
from parliamentary or proportional representation system might be read as attempts to 
alter the system (in favor of large parties).
Taagepera and Shugart identify district magnitude—the number of seats per 
district—as the most important variable in the study of electoral systems (1989, 19). 
Districts with higher magnitudes have a greater correlation between the number of votes 
gained and the number of seats in the legislature. The greatest difference is between 
states with a majoritarian system based on single-member districts (ex: the United States) 
and those with proportional representation for one district for the entire country (ex: 
Israel). Most systems fall somewhere in between. The relationship of district magnitude 
(M) to the proportionality of a system depends on the type of electoral system in place. 
For PR systems, a higher district magnitude creates greater proportionality, while for 
majoritarian systems, lower district magnitude leads to greater proportionality. However, 
when at very low district magnitudes, the exact value is crucial. For example, when M=1 
or M=3, the distribution allocates a majority of seats to one party without a necessary 
majority of votes. This is referred to as a “manufactured majority” {ibid. 112-4). The 
choice of district magnitude in a newly established democracy can thus have 
ramifications for the formation of a political party system: at certain values of M, the 
system may favor certain parties or party system structures over others.
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Once a list parliamentary system has been decided upon, a means of allocating 
seats must be determined. Formulas for seat allocation are based on either subtraction or 
division. The subtraction systems establish a quota (number or percentage of votes) 
which is then divided from the total votes received by a party each time that party is 
allocated a seat. The most obvious way to do this is the simple quota in which the total 
number of votes is divided by the total number of seats. Although the simple quota is the 
most neutral system, it generally leaves large remainders which must then be distributed. 
Probably the most widely-used quota system is the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota: the 
number of votes gained by the party (in a given district) is divided by the district 
magnitude plus one: Q = V/(M+1). This quota gives somewhat of an advantage to larger 
parties than the simple quota, but is generally considered fairly neutral. The Imperiáli 
quota [Q=V/(M+2)], which is slightly smaller than the Hagenbach-Bischoff quota, does 
tend to favor larger parties (Taagepera and Shugart 1989, 30-1).
The other type of seat-allocation formula is based on division. In this system, a 
series of divisors are established, by which the total number o f votes is divided each time 
a seat is allocated. The most common divisor formula is the d’Hondt rule, which is based 
on the successive divisors: 1,2,3,4, and so on. According to Taagepera and Shugart, 
“d’Hondt is relatively favorable to large parties (or alliances, where the law permits 
them)” (1989, 33). Thus the choice of seat allocation formula can have a small effect on 
the structure of the party system, especially if a formula which favors a certain kind of 
party is put into effect.
A final factor that has a more obvious, although less important, effect on the 
structure of the political party system is the level of the electoral threshold. A threshold 
is a given number or percentage of votes that a party is required to gain in order to be 
allowed into parliament. Because too many political parties is seen as confusing to voters 
and less than efficient, states employ thresholds to prevent excessive pluralism. The 
threshold value is therefore important especially for small or new political parties, which 
must fight to reach the set level. Thresholds in the post-communist states tend to be 
higher than in Western Europe (Birch 2003, 31). Another ramification of thresholds can 
be seen in voting behavior. Because voters want their vote to “count”, they may be 
unlikely to support a party that is at or below the threshold level, because if that party
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does not overcome the threshold, those votes are considered “wasted” (Birch 2003, 11). 
The possibility of vote wastage may further deter individuals from supporting a party that 
might otherwise be their first choice.
E. Political Party Typologies
In addition to characterizing the political party system, it will be useful to have a 
model through which to describe and categorize the political parties themselves. Many 
schemes have been devised in the comparative study of parties, and some are of more use 
than others, especially in the context of post-communist Europe. One of the most basic, 
and therefore most common, ways of categorizing political parties is based on their 
position on an ideological left-right spectrum. This type of divide, which also finds roots 
in the traditional cleavage structures raised by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) is generally 
accepted to apply for Western European political parties. The applicability of the left- 
right spectrum for political parties in the post-communist world has been called into 
question. Kitschelt (1992) characterized the ideological axes of Western Europe and 
CEE as aligned differently. In Western Europe, the axis places non-economic liberals 
with those against market economics on the left and pro-market forces with 
“authoritarian” non-economic views on the right. On the other hand, in CEE, the 
authoritarian views tend to align on the left with the anti-market forces, while the right is 
made up of pro-market and non-economic liberals.
In the context of this paper, the left-right ideological axis is only partially useful. 
With regards to the Czech Republic, it has been argued that voters identify with and align 
themselves according to (although not exclusively) the left-right spectrum, although the 
liberal-authoritarian divide described above arguably gives it some different qualities 
than a similar axis in Western Europe (Matějů and Vlachová 1997). In Slovakia, the left- 
right divide is arguably less salient for voters. Rather, in the mid 1990s, Slovak political 
scientists argued for the judgment of Slovak political parties according to “how they play 
the game”—their respect for (Westem-style) liberal democracy and its tenets. The 
scheme of “standard” and “non-standard” parties emerged as a means of distinguishing 
among the parties on both the left and right of the ideological spectrum (Učeň 1998, 
Mesežnikov 1999).
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In addition to the traditional left-right axis, authors have developed more nuanced 
typologies which provide a richer and more accurate description of parties while allowing 
for categorization, thus facilitating comparison. One of the earliest typologies 
distinguishes between cadre and mass parties according to how the party is organized 
(Duverger 1954). Cadre parties were traditionally elite-based with very loosely 
organized information networks, while mass parties evolved with universal (male) 
suffrage and represented working-class interests with an intense organizational structure 
which relied on sheer numbers as a major resource. In contemporary usage, the terms 
have evolved to distinguish between loosely organized parties or those with low 
membership (cadre) and well-organized parties or those with large membership bases 
(mass) (Wolinetz 2002). Another dimension was added to this typology by Kirchheimer 
(1966): the “catch-all”party, a vague concept which has been variously interpreted as a 
leader-centered party, an opportunistic party seeking votes, or a party tied to interest 
groups. A final dimension is the “cartel party” (Panebianco 1988), a party looking to 
gain resources from the state, and willing to cooperate simply to gain power. This linear 
development model is not very useful for new and emerging party systems, however. It 
follows a much more prolonged period of development that occurred in partially before 
the establishment of universal suffrage and thus consolidated democracy. For developing 
parties, a more fluid and less linear model is necessary.
Wolinetz (2002) categorizes political parties into three groups based on “facets of 
parties’ or factions’ behavior and preferences” which reflect party organization and 
structure (149). The three types are: vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking. 
Much as the names imply, vote-seeking parties are those that focus solely on winning 
votes and thus do not have a solid program and often have only the minimum level of 
organization needed to win on local, regional, and national levels. On the contrary, 
policy-seeking parties look to pass certain policies, whether they are well-defined, multi­
faceted programs, or single issues. Policy-seeking parties have an active, but not 
necessarily a large membership. Finally, office-seeking parties emphasize getting into 
office, either through holding power alone or sharing it; office-seeking parties look to 
gain state patronage. Their main participants will be those holding or seeking office 
(149-153). These are only ideal types, as in practice most parties act to obtain more than
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one of these goals. However, as party systems become more stable and institutionalized, 
the different priorities of each party should become visible. One of the main advantages 
of this approach is that unlike in Kirchheimer’s model, party change in Wolinetz’s model 
is not uni-directional. Movement among all three poles can be explained rather concisely 
through an analysis of shifting party priorities (see Figure B). A disadvantage is that 
Wolinetz structured the typology specifically for parties of Western European systems.
Figure B: The Wolinetz Model of Party Classification
Vote-seeking
Policy-seeking Office-seeking
Source: Wolinetz 2002, 161 figure 6.2
In a slight modification of Wolinetz’s scheme, Millard (2004) lays forth a 
typology developed specifically in response to post-communist developments in Central 
and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. The major types of parties Millard 
proposes are: ideological, electoral, populist, and communist successor. Although the 
ideological parties initially had weak or unclear programs, they have developed into 
parties which fit the traditional left-right scheme, and are often included in international 
party organizations, further proving their acceptance of Westem-style values and party 
structures. Electoral parties are of two types: “parties of power” and new umbrella
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parties. While the former is seen only in Russia and Ukraine, the latter characterizes 
several formations in CEE, and the Czech and Slovak Republics in particular. It refers to 
parties which retained the non-ideological, non-programmatic nature of the initial 
“umbrella organizations” of the immediate post-communist era (see below). The final 
category is the populist parties which have reacted to the hardships brought on by 
economic transformation, and take on a broad (and often vague) appeal of “helping 
people” (Millard 2004, Ch. 3).
In categorizing post-communist parties, this paper will follow Wolinetz’s 
typology, despite the existence of Millard’s scheme, intended specifically for post­
communist systems. Because Millard’s study encompasses countries that have 
experienced much less stable democratization and institutionalization of the party 
systems that those of the Czech and Slovak Republics, such a broad approach is not 
necessary or particularly beneficial. I find Wolinetz’s model more parsimonious, as it 
can be applied in cases where ideological ties are not binding, and it focuses rather on the 
organization and behavior of the parties. Thus for the Czech and Slovak parties, I will 
use a combination of ideological classification, the specific Slovak standard and non­
standard division, and Wolinetz’s 3-pronged model.
F. Methodology
This study is methodologically based on comparative analysis of qualitative and 
quantitative aspects of the political party systems in two similar states from 1989 until the 
present. Comparative analysis can be conducted using the most-similar or most- 
dissimilar method. The former places very similar subjects, processes or models in 
comparison and seeks to explain the differences between them. This is the most 
appropriate method for this study. In describing and analyzing the development of party 
systems, established variables (outlined above) will be used: the number and relative 
strength of parties (measured by the percentage of vote gained and mandates within 
parliament), ideological positioning of parties, and their interaction (primarily through 
coalition-building). The sources for this study include primary sources (election results, 
public opinion polls, party platforms) as well as secondary analyses.
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These two states were chosen particularly because of their shared historical 
context and their differences in the post communist era. Having been a single country for 
the majority of their post-war history, the two countries have a common contemporary 
history, struggle with communism, and similar cultures and languages. Although there 
were arguably separate political cultures even before the split of the country in 1993, they 
were governed as a functional unitary state, even after the designation of federal status in 
1968. With such a common political and social history, one might expect a fairly similar 
turnout in the development of the political party system. This, however, is not the case. 
Therefore, I will concentrate on the differences in the communist era, the democratic 
Czechoslovak state, and the states since the breakup of the federation in 1993. The time 
period chosen covers the entire post-communist era, as well as a brief review of the 
communist regime. This allows for discussion of historical experience, institutional 
choices and their effects, as well as the development of socio-political cleavages, all of 
which affect the way in which party systems develop.
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III. Analysis of the Czech and Slovak Political Party Systems
The following sections will describe and analyze the development of the party 
systems in Czechoslovakia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. The analysis is organized 
into sections based on electoral periods, as outlined in the Introduction. For ease of 
comparison, each subsection covers both states’ development, rather than describing the 
entire development of one state and then turning to the other.
A. Hegemonic Party Rule: 1948-1989
In studying the development of post-communist party systems, it is important to 
first outline where the political system is developing from; that is, the nature of the 
communist regime and the role of political parties and institutions under communism. 
The type of communist regime is important for the developments in Central and Eastern 
Europe after 1989. Kitschelt, et. al. (1999) have written extensively on the ways in which 
the pre-democratic regime type in this region affects the post-communist developments. 
According to them, the Czechoslovak communist regime was a bureaucratic- 
authoritarian system, meaning that the regime depended heavily on hierarchy, party 
discipline, and ideology in ruling. This type of regime is also marked by the absence of 
strong personalistic rule and the dominance of the professional bureaucracy. The party 
severely repressed any democratic opposition or extra-party civic mobilization. While 
the opposition under other types of communist rule gained negotiating power, the harsh 
repression of the Czechoslovak democratic opposition meant that groups outside the 
party had no power vis-á-vis the regime, and were not able to negotiate for change at all. 
Czechoslovakia is often considered one of the most repressive regimes in the satellite 
countries, along with East Germany.
Another characterization of the Czechoslovak regime is that of Linz and Stepan 
(1996, 316-321) in their study of democratization in Europe and Latin America. They 
classify post-1968 Czechoslovakia as a “frozen post-totalitarian” regime, emphasizing the 
changing nature of communist rule. The first twenty years of communist rule are 
considered totalitarian, characterized by ideological rule, strict repression, and late de- 
Stalinization. After the 1968 Soviet intervention, the regime outwardly continued its
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ideological fervor, but the sincerity disappeared, and the regime “froze” into a careerist, 
survivalist, post-totalitarian mode. Although the zeal of the regime disappeared, its strict 
outward adherence to Marxist-Leninist ideology precluded any reforms and led to its 
collapse.
The Communist Party System -  The National Front
Before moving on to a more extensive discussion of the regime collapse and the 
start of democratization, it will be useful to examine hegemonic party rule and the nature 
of political representation in communist Czechoslovakia. In Marxist-Leninist theory, the 
central political actor in society should be the working class. Political parties serve as the 
representatives of different social classes, but in a socialist society, there is only one class 
(the workers). Therefore, there is a need for only one political party to represent the 
interests of the entire egalitarian society of workers (Millard 2004, 29-30). This is the 
theory that led to the development of single-party rule and the party-state. In practice, 
some states had more than one political party, as was the case with Czechoslovakia.
The Czechoslovak National Front was originally established in 1945. In the 
immediate post-war years (1945-1948), the National Front existed as the cornerstone of 
political life. Parties that were active in political life and wanted to gain representation in 
parliament were required to be members of the National Front. Only six parties were 
members of the system, and only the National Front could give permission for the 
existence and activities of its members (Balík, Hloušek, Holzer, and Šedo 2003). The 
system was based on consensus rather than opposition, but effectively led to limited 
pluralism. In February 1948, the National Front was taken over by its largest member 
party, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (Komunistická strana Českoslovenksa, 
KSČ). Soon after, the KSČ gained control of each of the other members of the National 
Front. The KSČ forced the Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party (Československá 
strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD) and the Communist Party of Slovakia 
(Komunistická strana Slovenska, KSS) to merge with KSČ in 1948. The other parties: 
the Czechoslovak People’s Party (Československá strana lidová, ČSL), the Czechoslovak 
Socialist Party (Československá strana socialistická, ČSS), the Slovak Freedom Party 
(Strana slobody) and the Party of Slovak Revival (Strana slovenskej obrody) were
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allowed to survive. Despite the officially separate status of these parties, they must be 
considered satellites, as their actions were monitored and directed by the KSČ and their 
membership was reduced in some cases to just one-tenth of their pre-communist 
numbers. Non-communist and anti-communist groups were subject to strict oppression 
and most such groups were liquidated. From over 60,000 organizations, clubs and other 
groups, only about 700 remained after 1948 (Cabada and Šanc 2005, 102).
After the communist takeover, the National Front functioned to issue KSČ 
directives to the other parties and mass organizations, all of which were controlled by the 
party. The system was based on the principle of “democratic centralism,” which required 
subordinate members and organizations to submit to the decisions of higher members and 
organizations. Despite the reality of single-party rule, and in order to lend the regime (at 
least artificial) legitimacy, elections for public office were held on a semi-regular basis.5 
Candidates for public office were nominated and then had to be approved by the National 
Front, although they were not officially required to be communist party members. In 
practice, the vast majority of public officials were communist and those who might not 
still acted on the orders of the party. “Elections without choice” meant that individuals 
were given a ballot with only one list of possible candidates for office (Taagepera and 
Shugart 1989, 9-10). The only choice that could be made was not to fill in the ballot or 
not to vote at all. However, these actions often carried some form of castigation.
At the national level, officials were elected to the National Assembly. Although 
officially the legislative body, the Assembly rarely challenged the executive, and acted 
rather as a “rubber stamp” body (White, Gardner, and Schôpflin 1987). The post of 
deputy in the National Assembly was considered an honorary one, and deputies 
continued working in their normal jobs while serving as political representatives (Kubát 
1961, 697). Millard (2004) identifies the fact that deputies kept their jobs as a central 
part of “representation” as conceptualized under communist rule—deputies remained 
working people, and could thus properly represent them. The other means of ensuring 
that deputies and other officials were representative was the possibility of their removal 
from office (which was usually only done in the case of disloyalty to the party).
5 However, elections never took place during periods o f  weakened party control, such as Hungary in 1956, 
Czechoslovakia in 1968, or Poland in 1980-1 (White, Gardner, and Schôpflin 1987).
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Relations between the Czech and Slovak Republics
Even though Czechoslovakia existed as a single state during the entire communist 
regime, there are important differences in the experiences of each republic under 
communism. When the communist regime came to power, the Czech lands were much 
more industrialized and modernized than Slovakia. Slovakia had stronger agricultural 
mobilization and worker base, as well as a more important place for the church, which set 
the stage for a different kind of communist regime than in the Czech lands. The KSČ had 
somewhat lower public support in Slovakia in the 1946 elections (28-30% as compared to 
46%).
In the autumn of 1948, the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS) was subsumed 
into the KSČ, although it continued to function as a regional organization of the KSČ 
without dramatic organizational changes (Balík, Hloušek, Holzer, and Šedo 2003, 148). 
The two other Slovak parties remained nominally separate. The Freedom Party remained 
part of the National Front, but its importance and influence greatly decreased from what 
it had been before 1948. Similarly, the Party of Slovak Revival had a very low 
membership from 1949 on, and its role was perhaps more symbolic than actual. During 
the reforms of mid-1968, the Party of Slovak Revival attempted to distance itself from 
Marxism and supported the Dubček-led reforms, but returned to its previous state by the 
end of 1968 (Lipták 1992, 293-301).
Kitschelt et. al. (1999) consider the type of regime in Slovakia to be mixed 
bureaucratic-authoritarian-national accommodative, because the leadership in Slovakia 
was more liberal, alternative, and autonomous than its Czech counterpart and at times it 
relied on its domestic opponents to broaden its support base. Perhaps one major reason 
was the struggle for Slovak autonomy, which may have dampened the zeal for the 
Czechoslovak socialist state. The post-1968 “normalization” era was much less harsh in 
Slovakia than in the Czech lands, which were the center for most of the Prague Spring 
dissent. However, many fewer dissident groups emerged in Slovakia, and their impact on 
communist politics was very limited, “thus contributing to the organizational 
unpreparedness of the Slovak opposition when communist rule collapsed” (Bugajski 
2002, 282).
33
The Czech and Slovak Republics were governed by one regime throughout the 
communist period, and only in 1968 was the country officially recognized as a federation, 
rather than a unitary state. In 1968, the Constitution of 1960 was amended to include a 
provision that recognized Czechoslovakia as a federation of the Czech and Slovak 
Socialist Republics. The measure gave the Slovaks veto power in the Federal Assembly, 
but in practice unanimity continued until 1989 (Calda 1999, 4-5). One practice 
introduced to the constitution in 1968 was the “prohibition of majorization.” This 
principle was to prevent Czech dominance over the Slovak representatives, and called for 
voting on certain issues to take place separately in the federal Czech and Slovak Houses 
of Nations, and in the upper House of the People. In order to pass a Constitution and 
constitutional law, as well as legislation on issues such as the election and recall of the 
President, the budget and economic plans, state borders, language and citizenship laws, a 
majority in both the Czech-dominated House of the People, and in the Slovak House of 
Nations was needed (Just 2006). Although communist deputies were loyal enough to the 
party that this measure never became a problem under the communist regime, it played 
some role in causing the breakdown of the federation after 1989.
Forty years of experience under a communist regime necessarily left legacies that 
are very relevant for the democratization process. The oppressive role of the hegemonic 
party-state has consequences for the ability of new political parties to form and compete 
for the trust of a polity that is widely skeptical of parties. The existence of separate 
Slovak parties, however small and unimportant under the hegemonic party system, 
foreshadows the construction of two separate party systems, also influenced by the 
government structure held over from the communist regime, as we shall see. Finally, 
differences in the experiences of Czechs and Slovaks previews the differing emergence 
political and democratic cultures.
B. Regime Change and Opposition Coalitions
Regime Change in Czechoslovakia
Kitschelt et. al. (1999) have characterized the post-1968 regime in 
Czechoslovakia as one that was harshly repressive towards the opposition and extremely 
resistant to change or reform. Their model of regime change builds on their typology of
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the communist regime. This branch of regime change theory emphasizes path- 
dependency constraints on the rational courses of action available to elites. In 
bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, the elites held to power until the very end and 
repressed the opposition as long as possible. The opposition stays underground but is 
able to control enough resources to make a sudden leap for power, against which the old 
regime collapses. Kitschelt et al. identify this as implosion, but it has also been referred 
to as regime replacement or simply collapse.
Linz and Stepan outline why the other possible paths out of communist rule could 
not have occurred in Czechoslovakia: “In particular the hard-line regime gave no space 
for reformist moderates in the party state. Likewise, the opposition, while a great moral 
presence, had no negotiating capacity with the regime and indeed was not institutionally 
organized to conduct strategic and tactical negotiations” (1996, 321-2). This type of 
change happened much more quickly and thoroughly than in places where negotiations 
took place or the communist rulers agreed to reform, as was the case in most other CEE 
countries. After the collapse of the old regime, it was replaced with an interim 
government consisting mostly of members of the democratic opposition, but also some 
reformist members of the old regime.
The actual events of the collapse of the Czechoslovak regime have been described 
in detail from primary sources and personal experience elsewhere (Garton Ash 1990, 
Skalnik Leff 1998), and a repetition of the timeline of events would be unnecessary and 
redundant. This section will focus on the composition of the interim government, the 
institutional choices it made in the months leading up to the first elections, and their 
effects on later developments of the political and party systems.
In the Czech lands, the main opposition movement that emerged in late 1989 and 
early 1990 was the Civic Forum (Občanské fórum, OF), led by Václav Havel. Its 
counterpart in Slovakia was the Public against Violence movement (Verejnosť proti 
násiliu, VPN), founded in November 1989 (Bugajski 2002, 282). The existence of 
republic-level opposition movements led to the logical and immediate split of the party 
systems of the Czech and Slovak Republics after the collapse of the regimes in November
1989 (Cabada and Sane 2005). More on the nature and activity of these two movements 
can be found in the following section.
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The period from the collapse of the regime in November 1989 until the first 
elections in June 1990 saw the formation of an interim government consisting of both 
members of the old regime and members of both OF and VPN. In order to release the 
communist monopoly on power in the Federal Assembly, 120 deputies (40%) 
representing hard-core communist ideology were replaced with non-communist deputies. 
In the government, only 3 of 23 ministry positions were retained by communists. The 
sole objective of the interim government was to lead the country to the first elections. 
This required several institutional choices to be made, although the country still operated 
under the 1960 Constitution with some amendments until a new constitution could be 
passed in 1992. The major institutions that existed under the communist regime 
remained, but the processes to be followed would be democratic in nature.
Institutional Choices o f  the Interim Government
Some institutional changes and decisions needed to be made in order to deal with 
the new competitive institutions of democracy. I will outline those institutional choices 
which have a direct bearing on the political parties: the electoral system, seat allocation, 
and thresholds. Although a new constitution was not yet in place in 1990, the interim 
government did not plan to continue with the 1960 Constitution indefinitely. Rather, it 
decided that the first electoral period should last only two years and should have the 
purpose of designing a new constitution, and deciding on the status of the federation and 
relations between the two republics.
The electoral system chosen and imposed by the democratic opposition was not 
the one that would have been most advantageous for them. They chose proportional 
representation over a majoritarian system (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998). According to 
the theory of electoral systems, proportional representation leads most often to multiparty 
systems, while majoritarian systems are associated with the dominance of two parties 
(Duverger 1954, Riker 1982). Thus, the large anti-communist conglomerates of OF and 
VPN would have benefited from a system which favors large parties, but they chose a 
system more conducive to the formation of a multiparty system.
This choice at first seems unlikely and irrational; however, there can be several 
explanations. One might identify the choice as altruism or idealism in desiring a more
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representative system. Millard argues that OF originally wanted a single-member district 
(majoritarian) system, and intended to change after the initial period: “many saw 
proportional representation as second best in terms of its representative qualities, but 
sought in the (provisional) electoral law to stimulate party development before reverting 
to a majoritarian system” (2004, 38). Furthermore, OF saw its main goal as ushering the 
country into the first elections, and many of its leading members had little intention of 
pursuing a place as a major political party, especially considering the anti-political 
leaning of some of its leadership. Finally, as Birch (2003) notes, the effects of 
institutional designs were quite uncertain for emerging democracies, and any choice had 
the potential to produce unintended or unexpected results.
The proportional representation system chosen originally called for 12 districts (8 
in the Czech lands and 4 in Slovakia) and the number of seats allocated to each district 
depended on the turnout in the particular district. Elections for the federal level and the 
republic level were held at the same time. In order to somewhat personalize the electoral 
system, OF introduced the idea of semi-open lists, where voters could identify up to four 
individuals per party list. To allocate the seats, the Hagenbach-Bishchoff quota was used, 
making the number of votes needed to gain a seat in a given district slightly lower than 
with a simple quota system (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 113-4).
The final electoral choice that is considered important for the resulting party 
system is the use of thresholds for entrance into parliament. Electoral thresholds are used 
to discourage excessive plurality, which can be confusing for voters and destabilizing for 
the party system. The existence of a high threshold, however, does not indicate a stable 
party system. Birch (2003, 31) has observed that thresholds in the emerging democracies 
of Central and Eastern Europe are in general much higher than those in established 
Western European democracies. In 2000, the average threshold for Western European 
parliamentary systems was 1.23% while in 20 CEE states, the average was 4.25% (ibid.). 
The initial thresholds in the Federal Assembly were 5% in either the Czech or Slovak 
Republic. For the Czech National Council, 5% was also required, while for the Slovak 
National Council it was reduced to 3% (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998, 116).
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The Establishment o f  Political Parties
The period before the 1990 elections was also a time of formation of political 
parties, both new and renewed historical parties. After 40 years of single party rule, it is 
quite understandable that the initial post-communist period was characterized by a deep 
and widespread lack of trust in political parties. Potential parties were also constrained 
by a lack of resources. This made the large umbrella organization, Civic Forum (OF) a 
popular alternative, and many parties competed in the first elections as members of the 
OF.
Despite the hostility, new parties managed to form and organize in order to 
compete in the first elections. In the Czech lands, several new parties were formed in the 
months before the June 1990 elections: among them were the Civic Democratic Alliance 
(Občanská demokratická aliance, ODA) which competed as part of OF; the Christian 
Democratic Party (Křesťansko-demokratická strana, KDS); the Christian Democratic 
Union (Křesťanská a demokratická unie, KDU) which contested the elections as a 
coalition with the renewed Czechoslovak People’s Party (ČSL); several regional 
Moravian parties (Hnutí za samosprávnou demokracii - Společnost pro Moravu, HSD- 
SMS; Moravské občanské hnutí, MOH; and Strana moravského venkova, SMV); the 
Green Party (Strana zelených, ČSZ); and the Republican party (Sdružení pro republiku - 
Republikánská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ). Several other parties were “renewed” 
historical parties, the most important of which is the Czechoslovak Social Democratic 
Party (Československá strana sociálně demokratická ČSSD) (Cabada and Šanc 2005, 
108-113).
The only party that did not have to (or choose to) rebuild itself or establish a new 
organizational and electoral base was the Communist Party (KSČ). The Communist 
Party of Slovakia (KSS) gained autonomy and split from KSČ relatively early, and soon 
after the 1990 elections KSČ changed its name to reflect the regional differences, 
becoming the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (Komunistická strana Čech a 
Moravy, KSČM). While some obvious internal changes were made (the expulsion of the 
most hardcore members, distancing of the program from Stalinism, and decentralization), 
unlike communist successor parties in other post-communist countries, the KSČM did not
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break with the past or reform completely (Grzymala-Busse 2002). More on the 
development of the KSČM can be found in section III.F.
In Slovakia, VPN served a similar purpose as OF did in the Czech lands, 
attracting smaller parties as members and gaining a majority of votes. However, as in the 
Czech lands, several new parties were able to gather organizational strength and 
resources to successfully compete in the first elections. These parties are: the Christian 
Democratic Movement (Kresťansko-demokratické hnutie, KDH), two Hungarian parties 
that ran as the Party of Hungarian Coalition (Strana maďarskej koalície, SMK) and the 
separate Hungarian Independent Initiative (Maďarská nezávislá iniciatíva, MNI) which 
ran as part of VPN, the Democratic Party (Demokratická strana, DS), the Green Party 
(Strana zelených na Slovensku, SZS), and the right-wing, Slovak National Party 
(Slovenská národná strana, SNS). Finally, the regional Communist Party of Slovakia 
(KSS) regained its autonomy from KSČ, although the two parties contested the first 
elections under as one coalition party, gaining approximately the same proportion of 
support in the Czech lands and Slovakia.
Results o f  the First Elections
Table 1 shows the results in percentages of votes and percentages and numbers of 
seats gained by each successful party in their respective National Councils in the June
1990 elections. Because of the federal system, the elections in 1990 were held on 2 
levels: federal and republic. Consequently, three governments were formed: a federal 
executive government and 2 national-level governments. This can lead to some 
confusion in the discussion of coalition-building and governing. At the Federal level, the 
government was a coalition of the two largest parties represented in the Federal 
Assembly, OF and VPN. The Czech national government consisted of a coalition among 
OF, KDU, and HSD-SMS, with OF as the major coalition partner (Cabada and Šanc 
2005, 118). The Slovak national government was formed by the VPN, KDH, and DS 
(Bučan 2004, 95).
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able 1 -  Results of t íe 1990 Elections to the Czech and Slovak National Counci










OF 49.5% 124 62.0%
KSC 13.2% 33 16.5%
HSD-SMS 10.0% 23 11.5%
KDU-CSL 8.4% 20 10.0%
Slovak Národná Rada
VPN 29.3% 48 32.0%
KDH 19.2% 31 20.7%
SNS 13.7% 22 14.7%
KSC 13.3% 22 14.7%
SMK 8.7% 14 9.3%
DS 4.4% 7 4.7%
SZS 3.5% 6 4.0%
Source: www.volby.cz
Institutional choices can have an immediate effect on the results of elections and 
the party system, especially in newly forming democracies (Birch 2003). In the results of 
the first elections, several immediate effects of the decisions made regarding the electoral 
institutions are visible. First, the success of the communist successor parties, especially 
the non-reformed KSČM, is evident, and was arguably enabled by the choice of 
proportional representation over majoritarian system. It was further facilitated by the 
decision of OF leaders not to prohibit KSČ from running or to completely divest it of its 
finances and resources (Bugajski 2002, 230). Moreover, proportional representation 
stimulated party development. Although not entirely obvious from the results presented 
above, a great number of political and social organizations, groups, and movements 
sprung up in early 1990. Over 90 parties were able to gather the 10,000 signatures 
needed to establish a political party, and 23 qualified to run in elections, while 11 gained 
seats in one of the two national councils (and 9 at the federal level) (ibid. 232-3). The
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lower threshold (3%) in Slovakia further contributed to plurality, allowing the inclusion 
of 2 parties that would not have succeeded with a 5% threshold.
Opposition Coalitions: Their Formation, Organization, Initial Success and Demise
After the fall of communist rule and during the initial election period in 
Czechoslovakia, the party scene was dominated by two major “opposition coalitions”— 
the Občanské fórum in the Czech lands and Verejnosť proti násiliu in Slovakia. These 
parties, typical of the initial post-communist period, have also been called “movement 
parties” (Ágh 1998), “forum parties” (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998), and “umbrella 
organizations” (Gill 2002). Each of these monikers describes a similar phenomenon, but 
emphasizes different aspects. The first focuses on the spontaneity associated with their 
organization and goals: “The cult of spontaneity was characteristic of [movement 
parties], since they tried to overcome the division between everyday life and politics, and 
this brought with it a domination of horizontal ties over vertical ones. ...Their programs 
were vague, emotionally supported and directly connected with such actions as mass 
demonstrations.” (Ágh 1998, 203). “Movement parties” strove to represent the ideal 
unity of society and reflected accurately the deep-seeded distrust in society of rigidly 
hierarchical political parties. Even in the names (forum, movement, etc.), one can 
identify the repulsion to parties, and some analysts do not consider them parties at all, but 
rather coalitions or conglomerations of the democratic opposition.
Elster, Offe, and Preuss’s term “forum parties” places emphasis on the “non­
political politics” philosophy of the leading dissidents who led the movements.6 “Central 
to the idea of anti-political politics, conceptualized by V. Havel, G. Konrad, A. Michnik, 
and other dissidents was its concern for an autonomous civil society, which would be 
independent from the state rather than connected to it with parties as mediators” (1998, 
132). The movements did not desire to create strong ties between citizens and the parties, 
but rather to act as loose intermediaries with a society that organized on its own, 
independent of the state. Finally, the term “umbrella organizations” calls attention to the 
fact that the movements were in fact very ideologically diverse and reluctant to transform
6 An excellent discussion of the development o f  “anti-politics” can be found in Tucker, et al. (2000) “From 
Republican Virtues to Technology of Political Power: Three Episodes o f Czech Nonpolitical Politics” in 
Political Science Quarterly 115:3. Autumn 2000, 421-445.
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into coherent political parties. It also previews a reason for the short life span of the 
movements.
But like umbrella organizations elsewhere, these were reluctant to transform 
themselves into political parties; there remained within them strong anti- 
organizational, anti-hierarchical sentiments, a lack of discipline, coherence, 
communication and accountability. But social movements cannot function 
effectively as governments, and under the pressure of having to make and 
implement decisions of national importance, these organizations began to fray. 
(Gill 2002, 37)
Thus it is clear that these opposition coalitions lacked firm organizational structure, 
programmatic goals, and even the will to carry on as true political entities. Their 
relatively early demise after their initial success in the first post-communist elections may 
not come as a surprise. Nevertheless, a more in depth look at their formations, and the 
cleavages that developed within both will help to set the stage for analysis of later party 
developments.
Občanské Fórum
Because of the repressive attitude of the Czech communist regime towards the 
democratic opposition, only very loose, informal groupings of dissidents were able to 
function. The origin of the Civic Forum was informal and spontaneous. It was 
composed of the “democratic opposition” of all colors (liberal, Catholic, leftist, humanist, 
etc.), with 14 different parts or factions in all (Cabada and Sane 2005, 110). The leaders 
were against the idea of a strong organizational structure, or a hierarchy within the party. 
Rather than developing a specific program, the OF had one major governing objective, 
which was to get Czechoslovakia through the first free elections in 1990 (ibid.). Because 
of the short preparation time between the November 1989 fall of the regime, and the June
1990 elections, several would-be political parties joined forces with OF in order to gain 
representation in parliament. The most notable of these is the Civic Democratic Alliance 
(Občanská demokratická aliance, ODA). Being the largest political organization (albeit 
informally organized), the OF did immensely well in the June 1990 election. The 
National Council results are available in Table 1 above. Additionally at the federal level, 
OF gained 53.2% of Czechoslovak votes in the Chamber of the People (amounting to 
36.2% for the entire republic), giving it 68 of 150 seats available to Czech parties.
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Even before the elections, factionalization began to occur within the OF. 
Bugajski (2002, 231-2) identifies two major ideological streams that emerged within OF: 
the “coalitionists” and the “partisans.” The coalitionist group was associated with 
President Václav Havel and identified as liberals, hoping to retain the “original 
movement as a broad association spanning a range of political trends and ideologies” 
(ibid. 231). They were criticized by the partisans, such as Václav Klaus, who looked to 
develop coherent political parties, and argued that retaining the loose quality of the 
movement would hinder the development of a multi-party system. Those representing 
the coalitionist group adhered to the abovementioned descriptions of “umbrella 
organizations” while the partisans felt that OF had “outlived its usefulness once the new 
non-communist parliament was installed” (ibid.).
Although these two wings of the OF agreed to remain together through the 
elections, by January 1991, the Forum had decided to split into various coherent political 
parties (ibid. 232). The conservative, market-oriented partisan faction formed the Civic 
Democratic Party (Občanská demokratická strana, ODS) while the coalitionist wing 
crystallized into the more left-liberal, loosely organized Civic Movement (Občanské 
hnutí, OH) (ibid. 234). Furthermore, the already formed ODA dropped its ties with the 
OF and became a separate entity before the 1992 elections. Thus from one major centrist 
organization emerged two key players on the right wing of the political spectrum: ODS 
and ODA, and a minor player, OH, that was to lose steam before the elections. With only 
the unreformed KSČM on the left, the dominance of the political right begins to be 
visible.
Veřejnost 'proti Násiliu
In much of the literature, VPN is considered the Slovak counterpart to the Czech 
OF. Much like the OF, the VPN included a wide assortment of very different 
personalities and ideological leanings. Lid’ák, Koganová, and Leška (1999) have 
identified six key groups comprising VPN: reform communists, Christian dissent, civil 
dissent, green and ecological movements, pragmatic and non-entangled communists, and 
artists and actors. Each of these groups is associated with different successor parties, 
some of which split or formed independently even before the 1990 elections (such as
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some members of the Christian dissent group who formed the KDH). The governing 
ideology of the VPN was the rejection of communism and nationalism and support of 
market reforms and a federal state. VPN was not quite as successful in Slovakia as OF 
was in the Czech lands. It gained 32.5% of Slovak votes in the federal House of the 
People, amounting to 19 of 150 Slovak seats. The national level results can be found in 
Table 1. Unlike in the Czech lands, the VPN faced a major challenger in the KDH, 
which gained 19.2% of the votes at the national level.
Like its Czech counterpart, the VPN faced internal divisions soon after the first 
elections, during the rule of a VPN-led coalition (Slovak national) government. Učeň 
(1999) identifies two major groups within VPN: the “vision-bearers” and the “power 
pragmatics.” The former consisted of moderate liberal democrats who ran the party from 
its headquarters, and the latter were those who had moved into state institutions. The 
power-pragmatics were associated with Slovak Prime Minister Vladimír Mečiar. The 
main conflict between the two groups, according to Učeň, was not the ideological stance, 
but rather the manner in which politics should be carried out. To some extent the 
divisions in OF also fell along these lines, but within VPN, the contrast was much more 
extreme: “[The power-pragmatics] showed rather strong bent towards an aggressive and 
non-consensual political style, the use of extra-legal pressure (blackmail, manipulation 
with files of the secret police), and the employment of misinformation and incitement of 
an atmosphere of crisis and emergency in order to tamper with and exploit public 
opinion” (ibid. 87). In addition to the power struggle within the VPN, several policy or 
ideological cleavages existed. One of these, which the Mečiar group adopted and used as 
a platform for nationalist populism, was the desire for greater Slovak autonomy within 
the federation.7 Another point of contention was the type and speed of economic 
reforms, as the economic transition had much harsher social repercussions in Slovakia 
from an early date (Lid’ák, Koganová, and Leška 1999). The power-pragmatic group 
used the social discontent about the economic reforms to promote “economically 
grounded nationalism” (Učeň 1999, 87).
7 Although the eventual outcome of this struggle was two separate states, Meciar’s initial plan for Slovakia 
was not full independence, but rather a mixed form of autonomy and cooperation with the Czech Republic 
(Just 2006).
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The attempts of the Mečiar-led power-pragmatic group to gain more power within 
VPN culminated in the formation of the “Za demokratické Slovenska” faction. By the 
spring of 1991 the faction had formed a new political party: the Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia (Hnutie za demokratické Slovensko, HZDS), shortly after Mečiar 
was asked to leave VPN in hopes of keeping it together (Učeň 1999, 87; Bugajski 2002, 
284). An anti-Mečiar faction also emerged from the remains of VPN—the Civic 
Democratic Union (Občianska demokratická únia, ODU), which supported the 
maintenance of the federation and aligned itself with the values of the Czech ODS (Rose 
and Munro 2003, 127). A third party that left the VPN was the Hungarian Civic Party 
(Magyar Polgári Part-Mad’arská občianska strana, MPP-MOS), which had already 
formed before the 1990 elections, but contested them as part of VPN. As a result of the 
breakdown of VPN into several smaller parties, the KDH became the largest party in 
parliament, with 31 seats (Bučan 2004, 95).
Why Did Opposition Coalitions Emerge?
There are several reasons why the immediate post-communist political system 
may have been predisposed to the emergence of large, loosely-organized political 
movements such as OF and VPN rather than coherent political parties. The first of these 
is perhaps obvious. In the six months between the fall of the communist regime and the 
first free elections, there was simply not enough time for political groups (that had been 
severely repressed before November 1989) to form coherent programs, ideologies, or 
organizations. Often the first “parties” were simply groups of people with similar 
opinions, but very few material resources (Elster, Offe, and Preuss 1998). Secondly, the 
first election in most post-communist states was essentially a referendum or plebiscite for 
the new, non-communist system (Millard 2004; Bugajski 2002, xx). As such, the 
primary political divide was democracy vs. communist. In many cases, individuals, even 
leaders of political movements, knew that they wanted a democratic system, but 
democracy was simply defined as “not communism” (Holý 1996) so programmatic 
differences between the various anti-communist groups were marginal in the early 
months of party formation. The importance of a second division in the Slovak context is 
clearly visible: the debate over federation or independence in part led to the split of VPN.
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A final reason for the popularity of large, non-party formations was the lingering lack of 
trust in political parties, conditioned by the experience of 40 years of single-party rule 
(Cabada and Sane 2005).
Evaluation of the Party System, 1989-1992
Before launching into a formal evaluation, it will be useful to note one important 
feature of the development of the Czech and Slovak party systems. Although during this 
time period, Czechoslovakia remained intact, I talk about separate party systems, because 
in effect, the parties that were most successful in the first two elections were those that 
found their base in one republic or the other. Leff notes that parties concentrated on the 
republic level because organization was much easier at that level, and parties would be in 
a position to contest both federal and republic elections (1998, 134). While perhaps the 
most efficient means of organizing politically, the republic-level party systems, as will be 
argued later, helped to seal the fate of Czechoslovakia.
Major Divides
The divisions present in Czechoslovak society during the initial electoral period 
are relatively few. By far, the most important cleavage was that between supporters and 
opponents of the communist regime. Following the descriptions of the first post­
communist elections as merely a plebiscite on the legitimacy of the old regime, most of 
the newly formed parties identified simply with an anti-communist platform. This is true 
in both the Czech and Slovak party systems—where the KSČ stood for the old regime 
and the rest of the parties were against communism. In Slovakia it is also possible to see 
the beginnings of cleavages that will become more salient in the following electoral 
periods. These are based especially around ethnic cleavages and the national closure- 
cosmopolitan opening divides. The ethnic divide between Czechs and Slovaks, while not 
important in the Czech lands, became of great significance among Slovak parties, leading 
each party to articulate a stance either for or against the federation. The SMK represents 
the major ethnic cleavage within Slovakia: the Slovak majority and the Hungarian 




Following Ware’s (1999) criteria for evaluation of a political party system, I will 
briefly analyze four major aspects of the Czech and Slovak party systems during the 
initial post-communist period. The first criteria is the number (and relative strength) of 
parties in the system. In the case of both systems, many more parties contested the 
elections than won seats in the National Councils: of 13 Czech parties, only 4 received 
seats, and of 23 Slovak parties, 7 entered parliament (Birch 2003, Rose and Munro 2003). 
The relative strength of the parties at such an early stage is an irrelevant indicator, 
especially considering the lack of cohesion of the dominant parties in each republic (OF 
and VPN) and their subsequent split into several parties of varying strength. With 
hindsight, it is rather easy to evaluate the relevance of parties, and it can be said that in 
the Czech National Council, three of the initially elected players can be considered 
relevant (OF, KDU-ČSL, and KSČ), while the regional HSD-SMS is largely irrelevant. 
Because of its failure to stabilize, and the untimely death of its leader during the first 
electoral period, HSD-SMS was unable to integrate into the Czech party system and 
gathered no votes in the next election (Springerová 2005). In the Slovak system, the 
Green party, which barely passed the 3% margin, can also be considered irrelevant. The 
communist successor parties—the reforming KSS and the unreformed KSČM, running as 
one party in 1990— in an election based largely on the rejection of communism, managed 
to receive a fair percent of the vote (just above 13% in both National Councils), but 
remained a party without coalition potential (and perhaps without blackmail potential) in 
the first electoral period.
The second facet of evaluation is the stance of the parties towards the legitimacy 
of the regime. Several anti-system parties emerged: most notably the Slovak National 
Party, and the Czech Republican Party (which received only 1%). The Czech 
Communist Party can also be considered an anti-system party in this period as it rejected 
the change to democracy, although it played by the new rules. Ideologically, in the 
Czech lands, a clustering of parties on the right of the political spectrum is visible, 
especially after the breakdown of OF, with its largest component being the rightist ODS. 
The Slovak party, emerged with a similar situation, although, as we shall see the left 
became more diverse. Finally, it is clear that the penetration of society by political
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parties is extremely low in this period. Again, the distrust in parties and residual “anti­
politics” can be cited as evidence. Low party penetration of society also enabled new 
parties to emerge and splintering to occur within newly established parties. During the 
period from 1989 to 1992, the party system was neither stabilized nor consolidated. 
Rather the period was marked by a great plurality of new political movements, and the 
initial, but important split of the opposition coalitions into more traditional political 
parties.
Because of the high degree of fragmentation and the relatively low degree of 
ideological differentiation among the parties, the political system in the Czech lands 
during the first period might be considered segmented multipartism. However, this 
categorization does not imply the stability which Sartori’s model imparts to it, because of 
the newness of the system. Rather the low ideological difference is a result of the lack of 
time and resources the parties had available in order to differentiate themselves from each 
other and create coherent programs. The Slovak system comes closer to Sartori’s model 
of atomized multipartism, which is characterized by a very high degree of fragmentation, 
with 15 or more parties. While not quite that many Slovak parties made it into 
parliament, the number was much higher and the dominance of the movement party was 
much lower than in the Czech Republic. Alternately, the system might be categorized as 
polarized multipartism, due to the high fragmentation and high ideological difference 
with centrifugal competition.
C. Beginnings of the Party Systems: 1992-1998
The 1992 Elections and the Disintegration o f  the Federation
The first electoral period was intended only as an interim government with the 
primary goals of establishing a new constitution and deciding on the new shape of the 
federation. However, the decision to limit these tasks to a two-year period is now widely 
considered to be one of the biggest mistakes in the building of the Czechoslovak 
democracies (Pithart, quoted in Horský 1993, 12). While the state of the federation grew 
to be perhaps the most important political issue in Slovakia, it remained relatively 
unimportant in the Czech lands, where economic and market reform took center stage in 
the 1992 election campaigns (Leff 1998, 131). The largest political players in each
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republic were also the largest splinter groups that formed from the former opposition 
coalitions: ODS (from OF) and the HZDS (from VPN).
The splintering within the party system prompted the desire of the larger parties to 
amend the electoral law to have stricter thresholds for parties and even higher thresholds 
for coalitions of more than one party. The Slovak National Council raised the single 
party threshold to 5% (from 3% in 1990); coalitions of two or more parties had to reach 
7% and large coalitions 10%. The Czech National Council required each party to gain 
5%, two-party coalitions to gain 7%, three-party coalitions 9%, and four or more parties 
11%. “Introducing higher thresholds seemed justified in order to create fewer and 
stronger parties (or party coalitions) thereby improving the preconditions for better 
government” (Elster, Offe, and Presse 1998, 117). However, it also became clear that 
those parties in favor of raising electoral thresholds were those who expected to pass 
those levels in the 1992 elections.
Table 2 -  Results of the 1992 Elections in Czech and Slovak National Councils














CSSD 6.5% 16 8.0%
LSU 6.5% 16 8.0%
KDU-CSL 6.3% 15 7.5%
ODA 5.9% 14 7.0%
SPR-RSC 6.0% 14 7.0%
HSD-SMS 5.9% 14 7.0%
Slovak National Council
HZDS 37.3% 74 49.3%
SDĽ 14.7% 29 19.3%
KDH 8.9% 18 12.0%
SNS 7.9% 15 10.0%
SMK 7.4% 14 9.3%
Source: www.volby.cz
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As can be seen in Table 2, the Czech party system after the 1992 elections looks 
quite different than that elected in 1990, with the addition of several new parties, and the 
first election of ODS and ODA, and the merger of the KDU and ČSL. A coalition 
government was formed by ODS, led by Václav Klaus, who became the leader of the 
new governing coalition, with the smaller ODA, KDU-ČSL, and Christian Democratic 
Party (Křesťanskodemokratická strana, KDS8) as junior coalition partners. In opposition 
on the left, ČSSD emerged, passing the 5% threshold by 1.5%, adding a new dimension 
to the Communist-dominated left. The other newcomers to parliament were the Liberal 
Social Union (Liberálně sociální unie, LSU), and the right-wing, anti-system Association 
for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (Sdružení pro Republiku- 
Republikanská strana Československa, SPR-RSČ), led by Miroslav Sládek. Finally, the 
Moravian regional parties continued their representation in parliament with 14 mandates.
Two main changes characterize the Slovak party system between 1990 and 1992. 
The first and most important is the split of VPN which gave rise to Mečiar’s HZDS, 
which gained nearly 50% of the parliamentary mandates in 1992. Secondly, the reform 
of the KSS, visible through the name change to Party of the Democratic Left (Strana 
demokratickej ľavice, SDL), the rejection of Marxist-Leninist ideology, and the 
embracement of liberal democracy. With the rise of HZDS, which gained 37.3% of the 
National Council votes, KDH lost some of its electorate, dropping from nearly 20% to 
under 10%. Due to a modified electoral law, the threshold in Slovakia was raised to 5%, 
excluding at least 2 parties (ODÚ and DS) that might have otherwise gained seats in the 
Slovak National Council. This somewhat decreased the plurality in the Slovak Council, 
although had little effect on Czech parties.
Within weeks after the 1992 elections, the struggle over the shape of the 
federation was in full swing. The elections had not brought any statewide parties into 
parliament, so debate was naturally divided according to the interests of the individual 
republics. One of the major issues of the time was economic reform, which had a much 
harsher social impact in Slovakia, and was capitalized on by the HZDS and SNS, along 
with the idea of a confederation beneficial for Slovakia. The victory in Slovakia of
8 The KDS was founded in 1990, and in the 1990 elections ran with KDU-ČSL. In the 1992 elections it ran 
as a coalition with ODS, and eventually merged with ODS in 1995.
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parties supportive of independence or greater autonomy “propelled forward the process 
of federal dissolution” (Bugajski 2002, 286). Parties favoring autonomy represented 89 
of 150 seats (HZDS -  74 and SNS -  15), even though public opinion polls showed that 
the Slovak public favored the federation (ibid.).
Because neither the Czech nor the Slovak population favored the disintegration of 
Czechoslovakia, the reason must lie elsewhere. Some authors propose that it was 
primarily the inability of elites to compromise on the shape of the federation that caused 
the split:
The elections thus produced clear winners in each republic, but different and 
incompatible winning coalitions in each case. Klaus’s commitment to 
wholesale economic reform and tighter federation was greatly at odds with 
median Slovak preferences. Mečiar’s decentralized confederation was totally 
unacceptable to Klaus. Without conscious effort to destroy Czechoslovakia, 
the two electorates, by focusing on republic-level concerns had nonetheless 
elected leaders who could not, and did not, reach agreement on how to 
continue the state. (Leff 1998, 131)
The inability of elites was exacerbated by an underlying institutional problem. Earlier I 
mentioned the principle of “prohibition of majorization” that was introduced in the 1968 
amendments to the 1960 Constitution, which after the 1992 elections was still the official 
Czechoslovak constitution. Effectively, this law gave the Slovak part of the Federal 
Assembly veto power over any constitutional proposal at the federal level (ibid. 133). 
The only government at the federal level that would be able to gain majorities in the 
federal Council of Nations was an ODS-HZDS coalition (Just 2006). The trouble with 
this is, as captured in the quotation above, is the vast ideological differences between 
these two parties and the consequent inability of their elites to reach an agreement on the 
shape of the federation. After failing throughout the summer and fall of 1992 to set out a 
federal framework, an agreement on the division of Czechoslovakia was passed on 25 
November 1992, effective 1 January 1993.
While the Czech and Slovak party systems were separate entities from the early 
days of the democratic regime, the disintegration of Czechoslovakia still had some 
indirect effects on the party system. Although new constitutions were formed in each
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republic, many laws, including the basic electoral9 and governmental structures remained 
intact. The federal assembly and government were simply dissolved, leaving the 
National Councils and the republic-level governments as the legislative and executive 
authorities of each new republic. Slovakia remained a unicameral legislature, while the 
Czech Republic’s new constitution called for a Senate, although the first elections for the 
Senate were not held until 1996 ambivalence over bicameralism (Rose and Munro 2003, 
136).
The Breakdown o f Opposition Coalitions and Formation o f Political Parties
The next period in both the Czech and Slovak party systems is the establishment 
and initial consolidation of “normal” political parties. I have already discussed the 
formation of the successor parties of the opposition coalitions. This section will deal 
with the next two electoral periods covering a span of about six years (1993-1998). In 
both states, early elections were held due to the breakdown of government following 
scandals. While the 1992 elections dramatically changed the map of party systems in 
both states, the following period saw changes rather in the structure of competition and 
ideological space. The major parties in each system seemed to be heading towards 
consolidation, but the party systems remained in flux during this time. In Slovakia, the 
period was also marked by the irregularities and semi-authoritarian nature of PM 
Vladimír Mečiar and the ruling HZDS.
Developments in the Czech Party System, 1992-1998
Between the breakup of the federation in 1992 and the elections of 1998, the party 
system of the newly founded Czech Republic was dominated by the rightist ODS party. 
This was in part due to the popularity of early economic reforms that effectively brought 
a market economy and competition with relatively few negative social impacts. Many 
citizens therefore supported reform. However, the ODS dominance was also caused by 
the weakness of the political left. The presence of anti-system parties on both the right 
(SPR-RSC) and left (KSCM) of the political spectrum meant their exclusion from
9 Both new republics continued using the district structures and seat allocation formulas that were chosen 
before the disintegration: the Czech Republic had 8 multimember districts and Slovakia 4; each used the 
Hagenbach-Bischoff method of distributing seats (Rose and Munro 2003)
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coalition politics “and thus delineated very narrow space for competition between 
governmental coalition and the rest of the opposition” (Kune 1999, 157).
Table 3 -  Results of the 1996 Czech Elections to Poslanec íá Sněmovna
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
ODS 29.6% 68 34.0%
CSSD 26.4% 61 30.5%
KSCM 10.3% 22 11.0%
KDU-CSL 8.1% 18 9.0%
SPR-RSC 8.0% 18 9.0%
ODA 6.4% 13 6.5%
Source: www.volby.cz
Under the leadership of the controversial and charismatic Miloš Zeman, the Czech 
Social Democratic Party (Česká strana sociálně demokratická, ČSSD) rose from 6.5% of 
votes in the 1992 elections to 26.4% in the 1996 elections. ODS still had a plurality of 
votes and formed another coalition with ODA and KDU-ČSL, but this time it had was a 
minority government, with only 99 (of 200) seats. The major increase in vote share for 
ČSSD meant not only greater representation in parliament, but that ODS needed its tacit 
support in order to govern as a minority government, and that ČSSD officials gained 
important parliamentary seats (e.g. Zeman became the speaker of the Chamber of 
Deputies) (ibid. 159).
Emerging on the right of the political spectrum in 1992 was the Republican Party 
(SPR-RSČ), which gained 6.0% of the votes in 1992 and 8.0% in 1996. This party 
represented an extremist right-wing and ethno-centric position and is generally 
considered an anti-system party. Thus, despite its representation in parliament, it was 
excluded from any multi-party cooperation, including coalition-building negotiations. 
Even more so than KSČM, SPR-RSČ represents a party which is unwilling to accept the 
practices of liberal democracy, and has even engaged in criminal acts (Vlachová 1997, 47 
footnote). While one of the major axes of the Czech political debate is economic affairs, 
the SPR-RSČ does not maintain a coherent economic program, but rather is extreme in 
terms of “authoritarian, racist, anti-European, and anti-democratic ideas” although it 
views itself and its voters as centralist (ibid. 50). However, the Republican run in 
parliament was rather short-lived, as they failed to reach the 5% threshold in 1998.
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Categorization o f  Parties in the Czech Republic
As mentioned in the Theory section, it is often difficult to apply one of the 
traditional means of categorizing parties—ideology—to political parties in the post­
communist world. Nevertheless, it has been argued elsewhere (Vlachová 1997, Matějů 
and Vlachová 1997, 1998) that the left-right divide is fairly salient in the Czech Republic, 
so I will employ it as one means of describing the parties. As a second, wider model, I 
will employ Wolinetz’s scheme of vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking 
parties.
The starting point shall be the dominant party from 1993 to 1998, ODS. This 
party can be considered rightist, or right-wing, because of its stance towards economic 
reform, supporting rapid and efficient transition to a market economy through voucher 
privatization, support of entrepreneurs, and free competition. It also carries a rather 
conservative social stance. At the other end of the spectrum (after 1996) is the ČSSD, 
which represents slower economic growth and a socialist economic model. While there 
are factions within the party representing the “third way” of the Blair Labour Party, and 
the more traditional social democratic stance, the party is certainly leftist, both 
economically and socially. ČSSD and other leftist parties also tend to attract those voters 
who see themselves as the “losers” of the transition process or who do not fully trust the 
new system (Matějů and Vlachová 1998). KDU-ČSL and ODA during this period 
occupied the center of the political spectrum. Finally, on the extremes are the 
unreformed KSČM and the right-wing extremist SPR-RSČ. Fiala and Hloušek (2003) 
argue that from 1996-1998, the left-right profiles of Czech parties mirrored the dominant 
socio-economic conflict lines in Czech society (in Cabada and Sane 2005). Thus from 
the point of view of ideology, the Czech system was approaching consolidation and 
stabilization during this period.
Using Wolinetz’s three categories of organization, behavior and structure, it is at 
times difficult to classify actual parties as one of the ideal types. Nevertheless, I will try 
to identify which type fits each party best. The ODS and ČSSD as large parties with 
substantial organization at national, regional and local levels, and well-defined programs 
can be considered policy-seeking parties. At the same time, because each party is large
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and attempts to attract a wide range of undecided voters in the center of the political 
spectrum, ODS and ČSSD both have aspects of vote-seeking parties as well. The two 
center-right parties, ODA and KDU-ČSL display characteristics of policy-seeking 
parties. During this time they cooperated with ODS, a party with similar ideology, and 
they remained fairly small parties, KDU-ČSL with a more coherent electoral base than 
ODA. Finally, the two anti-system parties might be considered policy-seeking parties, 
even though neither party had set forth a very coherent program. Before 1993, KSČM 
shunned reforms to its program that would have allowed it to appeal to a wider electorate, 
and concentrated only on its members. (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 145). Both KSČM and 
SPR-RSČ depended on protest votes in order to retain their parliamentary seats.
Developments in the Slovak Party System, 1993-1998
Upon Slovak independence in January 1993, Vladimír Mečiar became prime 
minister of Slovakia and formed a minority government with the support of the right- 
wing SNS and the communist successor SDĽ. However, because one of the major 
divisions within Slovak society had disappeared (the independence-federation divide), 
Mečiar faced a growing popularity problem. The platform on which his party had been 
elected had been fulfilled, and it became clear that the more pressing issues of 
consolidating the new state, which faced difficult economic problems (Leff 1998, 148). 
In the first few months, the new government faced its first major crisis over the selection 
of the president, which took weeks to resolve. Several members of the HZDS and the 
junior coalition partner SNS objected to Mečiar’s nominee for president (Roman Kováč, 
a former Slovak Communist Party member). As a result of this and other personal 
disputes, several HZDS members formed their own club. SNS withdrew its support for 
the government in March 1993, leaving HZDS without a majority. It took another 6 
months before HZDS was able to form another government in November 2003 (this time 
an official coalition with SNS), but this coalition received a vote of non-confidence 
(initiated by the Parliament) in March 1994 (Leff 1998, Simon 2004).
The first Mečiar government was followed by a short coalition government 
(KDH, SDĽ, and the DÚ—formed by HZDS defectors) led by Josef Moravčík took 
Slovakia through to the early elections held on 30 September and 1 October, 1994 (see
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Table 4). Several new formation are visible, namely the Association of Slovak Workers 
(Združenie robotníkov Slovenska, ZRS), a communist party that had separated from 
SD Ľ, and the coalition called Common Choice (Spoločná voľba). The formation of ZRS 
slightly destabilized the left of the political spectrum, and SDĽ contested the 1994 
elections under the name Common Choice in coalition with the Social Democratic Party, 
the Movement of Slovak Peasants (Hnutie podohospodarov Slovenska, HPS), and the 
Green Party (Strana zelených na Slovensku, SZS) (Rose and Munro 2003, 154-5, 
www.statistics.sk). Common Choice received 10% of the vote in 1994. In addition, both 
KDH and SMK improved their positions slightly over the last elections. However, 
Mečiar and the HZDS ran the campaign with the most resources and easily came out with 
a majority, though smaller than in 1992.
Table 4 -  Results of the 1994 Slovak Elections to Národná Rada
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
HZDS 35.0% 61 40.7%
Common Choice 10.4% 18 12.0%
KDH 10.1% 17 11.3%
SMK 10.2% 17 11.3%
DU 8.6% 15 10.0%
ZRS 7.3% 13 8.7%
SNS 5.4% 9 6.0%
Source: www.statistics.sk
HZDS gained 35.0% of votes, but with only 67 seats, it found coalition-building a 
more difficult process than before and Mečiar announced the new government only in 
December 1994. The new coalition was comprised of HZDS, SNS, and the newly 
formed ZRS. While this extreme left-right coalition seems unlikely, it should be viewed 
in the context of Slovak politics, in which the traditional left-right ideological divide is 
less applicable than in Western Europe or even the Czech Republic. Učeň (1999, 95) 




Slovak politics has been characterized throughout the post-communist era by the 
personalization of political conflicts. This seems to have intensified after the split of the 
federation. Leff argues: “In fact, whereas Slovak politics had previously revolved around 
relations with the Czechs, it now appeared to have become an intensely personalist 
politics that revolved around Mečiar him self’ (1998, 151). The growing controversy 
surrounding Mečiar and his way of conducting politics attracted some and repelled 
others, dividing Slovak politics.
During the first Mečiar government, “Mečiarism” emerged as a specific style of 
post-communist authoritarianism. This term describes the heavy-handed style with 
which Mečiar ran the HZDS and the government, often ignoring or bending the accepted 
norms of liberal democracy. One example has already been mentioned, in the way in 
which he handled the selection of the first president by parliament. Mečiar incorrectly 
assumed that his party members would go along with his choice, but an internal faction 
took advantage of the secret balloting to support candidate Michal Kováč. Mečiar 
demanded the resignation of his foreign minister, Milan Kňažko, after Kňažko publicly 
challenged Mečiar (Leff 1998, 148). During the 1994 campaign, Mečiar contested his 
1994 dismissal, and later as prime minister initiated formal parliamentary investigations 
against President Kováč for his involvement. He also repeatedly cut the presidential 
budget and other powers.
Mečiar started court proceedings against the MPs who had left HZDS in protest in
1993 to form DUS, challenging the legality of their remaining in parliament (ibid. 151-4). 
Even more alarmingly, in August 1995, Kováč’s son was kidnapped and taken to Austria 
where he was held on the basis of a warrant in an embezzlement case. The incident was 
later tied to the Slovak Information Service led by Ivan Lexa, a Mečiar loyalist (ibid. 
155). These examples show that Mečiar’s vision of how politics can and should be run in 
a post-communist democracy did not match that of established liberal democracies in the 
West. Mečiar became a sort of thorn in the side of those in the West looking forward to a 
democratic Slovakia, especially NATO and the EU. To that extent, Mečiar is quoted as 
stating “We will turn to the East if they do not want to have us in the West” (Simon 2004, 
168).
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In response to the aggressive tactics of the HZDS government, the opposition 
found solidarity and public support. In 1996, public support for HZDS fell to below 30% 
while support for the parties of the opposition was well above 50%. That year, the 
opposition parties KDH, DÚ, and DS had formed the so-called “Blue Coalition” led by 
KDH. This coalition “profiled itself as a center-right democratic opposition block 
prepared to cooperate with other democratic parties, including leftist parties and those of 
the Hungarian Coalition” (Mesežnikov 1999, 123). The coalition continued to enjoy 
higher levels of support than HZDS, bringing it troubles from the ruling party, especially 
in the lead-up to the 1998 elections.
Categorization o f Slovak Parties
Unlike the Czech system, Slovak parties are characterized by a lower salience of 
the traditional left-right ideological divide, and have seen, as mentioned above, a divide 
over the conduct of politics. When applicable, I have noted the ideological bent of the 
various parties, but the categories of “standard” and “non-standard” indicate more within 
the Slovak context (Učeň 1999). Simply stated, those parties associated with Mečiarism 
and that actively cooperate with the HZDS can be considered non-standard—HZDS, 
SNS, and ZRS. The rest of the parties, KDH, SMK, SDĽ, and DÚ are standard parties 
that abide by the accepted standards of liberal democracy. This divide will become even 
more important in the analysis of the 1998 elections.
Employing Wolinetz’s model, one finds examples of each party. HZDS can be 
considered a vote-seeking party, especially because of its lack of specific program and 
focus on winning at all levels in order to dominate politics. Mečiar has been known to 
employ populist, leftist, and conservative rhetoric in order to gain support. The HZDS 
coalition partners, ZRS and SNS can be considered office-seeking. ZRS especially looks 
primarily to gain office and the resources that come with it—otherwise, a left-wing 
communist party would have trouble remaining in coalition with parties like the HZDS, 
which is not consistently ideologically identifiable, and the SNS which is strictly right- 
wing nationalist. Among the “standard” parties, KDH can be considered policy-seeking, 
along with SDĽ. Although KDH originally emerged as a non-confessional mass 
movement, it gradually took on a more coherent conservative platform and a stable
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electoral base (Bučan 2004. 108). Finally, the Hungarian SMK can be considered an 
ethnically specific vote-seeking party, especially after the merger of the Hungarian 
Christian Democratic Party, Coexistence, and the MOS in 1994.
Evaluation of the Czech and Slovak Party Systems, 1992-1997
Major divides
In contrast to the first electoral period, the number and salience of divisions 
among the electorate increased in the period from 1992 to 1997. In the Czech lands, the 
social and economic divisions became arguably the most important, and defined the lines 
of competition for the parties. As Kitschelt, et.al. have argued, the economic liberal 
generally aligned with the socially authoritarian view, while the economic protectionist 
and social liberal position tended to align. After the 1996 elections, in particular, the 
ODS and ČSSD came to represent these two major economic and social alignments. The 
national closure vs. cosmopolitan opening divide grew in importance with the debates 
over entrance into NATO and the EU. However, during this period, the differences 
among political parties were not very marked with regard to this divide. Of fading 
importance was the division among supporters and opponents of the old regime, mostly 
because the only remaining defenders of the old regime were the KSČM, who had been 
largely isolated within parliament. Finally, ethnic divides have been minimal among the 
Czech population and are not reflected in the party system.
In Slovakia, the division that had previously dominated society—Czech vs. 
Slovak—disappeared almost overnight with the disintegration of the federation. This 
somewhat disoriented the major parties, especially HZDS, which had built itself on the 
struggle against Czech centrism. The ethnic divide between Slovaks and Hungarians 
remained salient, and the steady representation of the Hungarian parties indicate this. 
The economic and social divides were not as clearly defined as in the Czech lands. 
While the protest against Czech-led economic reform was part of the reason for the 
disintegration, the position of HZDS on the economic and social divides is less clear. 
Rather, Mečiarism took advantage of the fears of cosmopolitan opening and international 
pressure, clinging to a national-closure position and also playing somewhat upon the 
Slovak-Hungarian ethnic divide. Finally, as in the Czech Republic, the divide among
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supporters and opponents of the old regime quickly faded, especially because of the 
prominence of former communists in positions of leadership (Mečiar, Kováč, Ľupták, and 
others).
Aside from the cleavages covered above, personality became an important means 
of creating divisions within Slovak politics. Specifically, this applies to Mečiar, whose 
controversial means of conducting politics became a point of contention among the 
Slovak electorate. The divide between supporters and opponents of Mečiar is at least as 
relevant for the 1990s as any of the other divides discussed above, especially after the 
creation of an independent Slovakia. Leff argues: “In fact, whereas Slovak politics had 
previously revolved around relations with the Czechs, it now appeared to have become an 
intensely personalist politics that revolved around Mečiar him self’ (1998, 151). This 
divide continues today, even after Mečiar’s losses in parliament and in two bids for the 
presidency.
Classifying the Systems
From the 1992 elections until 1997, both the Czech and Slovak party systems saw 
some shifts in the number and relative strengths of the parties in the system, as well as in 
the ideological structure and the extent to which the parties penetrated society. From the 
3 relevant Czech parties identified in the last period (OF, KDU-ČSL, and KSČ), 6 parties 
can be considered relevant in the next two electoral periods. This includes all the 
parliamentary parties, of which the two anti-system parties (KSČM and SPR-RSČ) had 
blackmail potential, and the rest carried coalition potential. SPR-RSČ was probably the 
least relevant, especially considering its failure in 1998. The unreformed nature of the 
KSČM also affects the competition structure: “the differences between the KSČM 
supporters and their nearest neighbor on the left-right axis, the Social Democrats (ČSSD), 
were greater than between any other two neighboring parties...” (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 
143).
Although quite a few parties are relevant, the relative strengths begin to make a 
difference in this time periods. The most drastic example is the ČSSD, which emerged as 
a minor party in 1992, with 6.3% of the vote, but grew by 1996 into the second largest 
party with 26.4%, creating a system of two large parties with several smaller parties. By 
1996, ODS and ČSSD represented the major right and leftist parties in the system, with
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extremist anti-system parties occupying either pole of the ideological spectrum, and 
several smaller parties in the center. Finally, although the penetration of parties remained 
quite low during this period, it can be said that their infiltration of society increased over 
the previous period, as the ideological positions somewhat solidified. However, the 
parties remained much less ingrained within society than in Western Europe.
The party system in the Czech Republic can be said to reflect Sartori’s model of 
polarized multipartism, since there is high fragmentation among the parties, as well as 
fairly large ideological differences among the parties, especially on the left of the 
spectrum. This type of system is also characterized by centrifugal competition, driving 
the parties away from the center—visible in the rising importance of ODS and ČSSD 
representing the major poles. At the same time, the anti-system parties encroach on the 
competition space and somewhat prevent further polarization.
In Slovakia, the party system emerged rather differently from the first electoral 
period than in the Czech Republic. Seven parliamentary parties succeeded in the first 
elections, and in 1992, the number decreased to 5. Again in 1994, 7 parties or groupings 
entered parliament. During the entire pre-1998 period in Slovakia (after independence), 
the strongest party was HZDS, qualifying it as a system dominated by one party, with 
several smaller parties also succeeding. Unlike in the Czech Republic, where the anti­
system parties had no coalition potential, the anti-system SNS became part of the HZDS- 
led coalition.
The ideological structure of the Slovak party system is much less clear than in the 
Czech system. The dominant HZDS during this time occupied the center or center-left of 
the political spectrum. Mečiar used rhetoric and supported policy that claimed at once 
nationalist, populist and leftist goals. The HZDS coalition partners took on similarly 
confusing goals, although claimed an extreme leftist and the other a rightist-nationalist 
perspective. This made the ideological competition structure difficult for the other 
parties. Nevertheless, the “standard” political parties can be placed somewhat more 
easily on the political spectrum. On the right one finds KDH, DS, and DÚ, and on the 
left the SDĽ represents social democratic goals, similar to its West European 
counterparts. Handl and Leška find that the competition structure with HZDS occupying 
the center-left position throughout the 1990s made it difficult for SDĽ to appeal to a
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broader spectrum (2005, 111). The Hungarian Coalition Party finds a place in the 
center-right, although its appeal is limited to the Hungarian minority. As in the Czech 
Republic the extent to which parties penetrated Slovak society was presumably quite low. 
The amount of splintering which occurred within these electoral periods testifies to this: 
“The less penetration there is, the easier it will be for new parties to emerge and compete 
with existing parties” (Ware 1999, 150).
During the period of HZDS domination and government, the Slovak party system 
fits Sartori’s model of extremely polarized multipartism. The controversial style of the 
“non-standard” parties created centrifugal competition that led to a high degree of 
fragmentation. Despite the ideological ambiguity of the HZDS and other parties, it is 
clear that large differences between the parties existed, due to the style of politics 
conducted by the “non-standard” parties.
D. The 1998 Elections -  A Turning Point
The 1998 elections in both the Czech and Slovak Republics mark important 
turning points. Both systems experienced a shift of power from the party that had been 
dominating to a newly emerged party or coalition. The coalitions formed in both states 
serve as interesting points of analysis. The “hidden silent grand coalition” (Klíma 1999) 
in the Czech Republic was formed as a result of the elections, and marks the beginning of 
unstable electoral coalitions in the country, and the anti-Mečiar, EU-determined coalition 
in Slovakia formed before the election in order to oust the leading HZDS from power. At 
the same time, the governments installed in 1998 achieved electoral reforms in both states 
with consequences (major and minor) for the systems.
The Czech Republic -  A “Hidden Silent Grand Coalition ”
While the ODS enjoyed a fair margin of support throughout the early 1990s, it 
began to lose its grip with the rise of ČSSD, accompanied by the beginning of economic 
troubles associated with market reform, and a rash of financial scandals, tied primarily to 
the ODS, but also involving other parties. Minor scandals in 1994 had helped boost 
ČSSD’s popularity at the expense of ODS, but the major irregularities associated with
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privatization were revealed in 1997. On 28 November 1997 ODS was accused of 
receiving 7.5 million Kč from a privatization deal and Prime Minister Václav Klaus was 
asked to resign by two fellow ODS members (Jan Ruml and Ivan Pilip) (Simon 2004, 
60). During the subsequent months, until early elections could be held in the spring of 
1998, Josef Tošovský became prime minister and his government was supported by 
KDU-ČSL, ODA and some ODS members (ČSSD also voted for confidence with the 
promise of early elections). Thirty-two members of ODS (out of 69), led by Jan Ruml, 
quit the party and formed the new Freedom Union (Unie svobody, US) (ibid. 61). Much 
like the splinters from the early opposition coalitions, US became a parliamentary party 
before contesting elections. ODA was also affected by the scandals, as the leader, Jiří 
Skalický, resigned in 1998 when more financial scandals were aired. Several members of 
ODA also joined US.
Cabada and Sane (2005) see the 1998 elections as a shift to the left of the general 
Czech electorate, with the success of ČSSD and the disappearance of the extreme right- 
wing party. As expected, the Social Democrats gained more votes than the ODS for the 
first time. However, the ODS still managed to win 27.8% of the vote, despite the 
financial scandals plaguing the party leadership and reputation. While four parties 
remained in parliament from the previous electoral period, two parties, ODA and SPR- 
RSČ lost their mandates entirely. ODA’s downfall has been discussed, but the reason for 
the Republicans’ loss is not directly connected to the 1997 scandals. A look at the voting 
trends of Czech voters, specifically supporters of SPR-RSČ finds that those who support 
the Republicans tend to be extremely opposed to the ODS, but rather sympathetic, or at 
least apathetic to the Social Democrats (Vlachová 1997). Thus, perhaps some of those 
who had previously supported the Republicans turned to ČSSD in 1998 in order to 
deprive ODS of its dominant parliamentary role. This procedure is known as strategic 
voting and has been identified as important within Central and Eastern Europe, especially 
when voters feel that none of the parties represent their needs (Millard 2004).
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Table 5 -  Results of the 1998 Czech Elections to Poslanec cá Sněmovna
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
CSSD 32.4% 74 37.0%
ODS 27.8% 63 31.5%
KSCM 11.1% 24 12.0%
KDU-CSL 9.0% 20 10.0%
US 8.6% 19 9.5%
Source: www.volby.cz
I have already mentioned the imbalance of left and right in the Czech system, 
caused partially by the existence of extremist anti-system parties on both the right and 
left. Although the Republican Party disappeared in 1998, the Communist Party retained 
seats in parliament and remained unreformed, and thus an unacceptable coalition partner, 
even for the leftist Social Democrats. Coalition-building for ČSSD was limited by the 
ostracization of KSČM, as well as other ideological and personal conflicts among the 
parties. Discounting the participation of KSČM, several governments were possible: a 
right coalition of ODS, KDU-ČSL, and US would have gained 102 seats (out of 200), a 
right-left coalition of ČSSD, KDU-ČSL and US would gain a majority of 113, a grand 
coalition of the two leading and opposing parties would have produced a stable majority 
of 137 mandates. The first possibility was not raised, since ODS was not asked to form a 
government, although it would have proved impossible due to past rivalries between 
Václav Klaus and KDU-ČSL and US members who had been in coalition during the 
recent financial scandals. Both KDU-ČSL and US also refused to participate in a 
government with ČSSD for ideological reasons. Finally, the “grand coalition” was 
rejected by both ODS and ČSSD on ideological grounds.
The result of the 1998 coalition negotiations was a ČSSD minority government 
with the tacit support of ODS. Klíma calls this coalition the “hidden silent grand 
coalition”: “grand” because it consisted of the two largest parties, “silent” because the 
ODS held no direct ministerial appointments, and “hidden” denotes that the ODS was 
actually a hidden coalition partner, because it got special privileges for its cooperation, 
while the other remaining parties represented the true opposition (1999, 139-40). This 
rather strange coalition formed among the two parties with the least coalition potential 
can be said to mark the end of stable coalition government for the Czech Republic,
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continuing through late 2005. Its logic becomes rather clear when considering the 
limitations discussed above, and perhaps because each of the 2 strongest parties shifted 
slightly towards the “office-seeking” pole of our model, the coalition agreement (referred 
to as the “opposition agreement”) was signed in record time: “The elections took place on 
June 19 and 20, 1998, on June 30 [ČSSD] received the offer from [ODS], oral agreement 
was reached on July 3, and on July 9 the agreement was signed” (Klíma 1999, 139).
The minority government, led by Miloš Zeman, was both ambitious and unstable. 
If the opposition agreement stalled progress on issues over which the parties clashed 
ideologically, the arrangement did allow the two parties to exercise power, without being 
able to achieve any of their stated pre-election goals. With 137 of 200 seats, the 
“coalition” of ČSSD and ODS were able to change the constitution (which required 120 
votes). Klíma (1999) calls this use of power “negative coalition potential,” which the two 
parties used to pursue constitutional changes in their favor.
In reaction to this, the opposition parties (KDU-ČSL and US) along with two non- 
parliamentary parties (ODA and the Democratic Union, DEU) formed the “Four- 
Coalition” (Čtyřkoalice, 4K) for the 1998 Senate elections (held after the parliamentary 
elections). The 4K won enough open Senate seats to prevent a constitutional majority of 
ODS and ČSSD, and to become largest force in the Senate. Nevertheless, in 2000, the 
“grand coalition” passed major electoral changes that would have shifted to a more 
majoritarian system and curtailed the power of the president. The new law increased the 
number of electoral districts from 8 to 35, each with a district magnitude of 5 or 6 (versus 
the previous 20 or more). The law also would have changed the seat allocation formula 
to a modified d’Hondt formula.10 These changes were obviously designed to support the 
larger parties and make it more difficult for smaller parties to retain seats in parliament. 
The more majoritarian system would have also precluded the need for coalition-forming 
in many cases.11 They were justified with the reasoning that a system with too many 
parties is unable to consolidate and thus democracy cannot be consolidated. The logic
10 The modified d ’Hont formula established the following series o f divisors (1.42,2,3,4,...). In contrast to 
the standard d ’Hondt formula (discussed in Secion II), the modified formula would have increased the bias 
towards larger parties (see also Taagepera and Shugart 32-5).
11 For example, had the 1998 elections been conducted with the 35 smaller electoral districts, rather than 8, 
the ČSSD would have won a majority and would not have needed to form a coalition (Just 2006).
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behind his reasoning is faulty, as many Western European democracies have as many 
parties as the Czech Republic had at that time.
The 4K was not successful in preventing the passage of the 2000 electoral 
reforms, but was able to contest them in the Constitutional Court. Proceedings took half 
a year, and the ruling was in favor of the opposition and the President. All of the changes 
to the President’s power were struck, and the parliament was asked to revise the electoral 
formula to include a lower number of districts, and more proportionality (Just 2006). The 
result of long and difficult negotiations was the current electoral system. Fourteen 
electoral districts follow the already-established self-governing administrative districts, 
with 14 or 15 seats per district. The seat allocation formula was changed to the standard 
d ’Hondt formula, decreasing the bias towards larger parties.
The 1998 elections can therefore be considered a turning point for Czech politics, 
because they ushered in a leftward shift of the electorate, saw a decrease in the number of 
parties and the disappearance of an extremist party, and opened a new era of less stable 
coalition politics. At the same time, the beginnings of consolidation of the Czech party 
system are visible, with the major parties continuing and pursuing fairly coherent 
ideological positions. The years since these elections have seen relative stability in the 
ideological and competition structure of the Czech party system.
Slovakia: Anti-Mečiar Coalition
In Slovakia the party system and the political system in general are much less 
stable than in the Czech Republic. The 1998 elections in Slovakia can be considered a 
turning point, but did not bring the system any closer to stabilization or consolidation. 
Rather the elections brought out newfound solidarity among the opposition parties, as 
they combined to attempt to disrupt the power structure. New players were introduced 
and became important parts of the political spectrum, if only temporarily.
The difficulties facing the opposition party in the era of Mečiarism continued 
through 1998. Presidential elections (in Parliament) were scheduled for January 1998, 
but they failed after several months to come to a decision, and nearly brought the 
government to a standstill. President Kováč called for direct presidential elections, 
heightening the conflict between him and Prime Minister Mečiar. Also in 1998, the
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HZDS-led coalition successfully changed the electoral law, changing the entire country 
into a single district for PR seats, raising thresholds for coalitions of parties, and 
excluding some media from broadcasting (Rose and Munro 2003, 151-2). Each of these 
measures favored the governing party: the single district increased proportionality, but 
its benefits for smaller parties was decreased by the 5% threshold for single parties, and 
the requirement that coalitions gain 5% for each member party (two-party coalitions 
needed 10%, 3-party 15%, etc.). The exclusion of private media from reporting on the 
campaign and airing campaign advertising heavily favored the HZDS, which controlled 
public television as the governing party.
The outcry against these changes came from many fronts. The opposition parties 
were not only upset, but also found solidarity in the need to fight against the leading 
coalition, in order to displace HZDS and Mečiar. Objections to the new electoral law 
also came from the OSCE, the EU and the US (Simon 2004, 184-5). The raised 
thresholds were apparently intended to block the Hungarian Coalition Party (Strana 
Maďarská koalice, SMK) and the recently formed “Blue Coalition.” The former
consisted of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement (Maďarské
křestanskodemokratické hnutie, MKDH), Coexistence (Egyuttélés), and the Hungarian 
Civic Party (MOS-MPP). It became a single party, integrated on the national, regional, 
and local levels in 1998 in order to clear the thresholds added for coalitions. The SMK 
provides an example of the salience of ethnic voting in Slovakia, as the Hungarian parties 
cover different ideological standpoints, but united in order to fight against the nationalist 
sentiments of the HZDS government. In addition to the initial 3 parties in the Blue 
Coalition (KDH, DÚ, and DS), the Slovak Social Democratic Party (Sociálne- 
demokratická strana Slovenska. SDSS) and the Green Party of Slovakia (SZS) also joined 
forces, leaving the leftist Common Choice coalition under which they had run in the 
previous elections.
The “Blue Coalition” registered officially as the Slovak Democratic Coalition 
(Slovenská demokratická koalícia, SDK) with Mikuláš Dzurinda of the KDH as the new 
leader of the party. In 1997 SDK appeared able to gain enough votes to clear the 25% 
threshold that would be needed for a 5-party coalition. In attempts to weaken the 
opposition, Mečiar proposed an amendment of the new electoral law, requiring each party
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in a coalition to gain 5% of the vote—an effective ban on coalitions. When SDK 
successfully registered as a party12 in August 1998, Mečiar complained to the 
Constitutional Court that the SDK was not a party but a coalition, and should thus answer 
to different rules (Simon 2004, 123-5). Clearly, the uniting of the opposition was seen as 
a threat by the HZDS.
Table 6 -  Results of the 1998 Slovak Elections to Národná Rada
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
HZDS 27.0% 43 28.7%
SDK 26.3% 42 28.0%
SDĽ 14.7% 23 15.3%
SMK 9.1% 15 10%
SNS 9.1% 14 9.3%
SOP 8.0% 13 8.7%
Source: www.statistics.sk
The importance of the 1998 elections was not lost on the public—the turnout rate 
for the parliamentary elections was 84% (Simon 2004, 185). HZDS still gained the most 
votes, however, the SDK coalition of right and left parties initiated specifically to pose a 
viable challenge to HZDS achieved its goal, trailing by only 0.7%. A further result of the 
pre-election anti-Mečiar sentiment was that coalition building for HZDS became quite 
difficult, first with the disappearance of ZRS, its former coalition partner, and second 
with the unwillingness of any previous opposition party to cooperate. On the other hand 
the incentives for coalition building among the “anti-Mečiar” parties were quite high. A 
right-left governing coalition was formed, consisting of SDK, SDĽ, SMK, and the Party 
of Civic Understanding (Strana občanského porozumenia, SOP) and led by SDK 
chairman Mikuláš Dzurinda.
A comparison of the Slovak party system in 1998 with that in 1994 finds a similar 
structure with several “new” players that are actually renamed groups or coalitions of 
already existing parties. The Common Choice coalition split up again into its member 
parties, with SDĽ being the only one to enter Parliament on its own. The other members,
12 SDK registered as a single-party, requiring the representatives of its member parties to become SDK 
members, and by converting membership in the member parties to dual-membership with SDK.
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as mentioned, had seats as part of the newly-formed SDK. The major difference in the 
Slovak party system between 1994 and 1998 are the power and competition structures. 
Before the 1998 elections, the Slovak party system was undoubtedly dominated by the 
HZDS, and it could be considered a system with one large party and several smaller ones. 
After the pivotal elections, the structure of the system changed and if the parties within 
SDK are considered as separate parties, rather than as a single coalition, then the Slovak 
system began to appear as a more even multiparty system.
The new coalition had several goals that transcended the ideological differences 
between the member parties. First was the need to resolve the deadlock that had occurred 
over the selection of the president. In reaction to the failed 1997 referendum, a 
constitutional amendment was passed providing for the direct election of the president for 
a 5-year term (with a maximum of 2 terms). The president could no longer be recalled by 
the parliament, but only by the Constitutional Court or by referendum.13 Furthermore, 
the powers of the president were extended to include the dissolution of parliament, if the 
body is unable to make decisions or the government loses a majority (Simon 2004, 190). 
The first presidential elections were held on 15 May 1999 and the 2 leading candidates, 
Mečiar and Rudolf Schuster, faced a second round in which Schuster was victorious 
(ibid. 205).
The governing coalition had several other important goals to accomplish. High 
on the list was EU entrance, which had been stalled under Mečiar. This required the 
passage of a language law in fitting with EU standards, and the extremist SNS was 
successfully blocking the effort. The proposed draft law was met with disapproval by the 
Hungarian Coalition Party, a coalition member, as well as the opposition HZDS. Simon 
notes that “the language law challenged the coalition from within, from the opposition, 
and from institutions outside Slovakia” (193). Another task facing the government was 
the investigation and eventual prosecution of the irregularities that occurred during the 
previous government (ibid, 191-2).
13 The Slovak referendum method of recalling the president is rather unique. Parliament initiates the 
referendum for recall by a 3/5th or constitutional majority. The referendum is then presented to the public, 
where it must receive a majority of all eligible voters to become effective. If this majority is not received, 
it is considered a vote of no-confidence in the Parliament, which is then dissolved. This setup is designed 
to prevent the misuse of the presidential recall referendum (Just 2006).
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The 1998 elections were important for the development of the Slovak system, in 
that one sees the cooperation of opposition parties of various types uniting in order to 
displace the previous government. The opposition coalition might be portrayed as office- 
seeking, but since the goal of the parties for this term was not so much to gain 
government patronage, but to overcome the Mečiar government, which was seen as 
corrupt, damaging to democracy and the international reputation, and increasingly 
nationalist and populist. Furthermore, the change to direct election of the president 
indicates a step towards preventing further governmental crises, although the powers of 
the president as the executive were not significantly extended, and the major executive 
power still lies with the government and prime minister. While the ideological positions 
of the major parties remained somewhat stable, the competition structure and relative 
strengths of the parties changed quite dramatically in this election period.
The 1998 elections in both countries marked the beginning of a new period in the 
party systems for each country. Both the Czech and Slovak systems witnessed a change 
of power from the previously dominant party to the opposition for the first time since the 
dissolution of the federation. For the Czech Republic, this mean the beginning of 
consolidation of the party system as the two main parties found stabilized ideological 
positions and electorates, while instability is centered around the smaller parties. In 
Slovakia the change of hands from the semi-authoritarian HZDS to a wide coalition 
government aimed at recovering Slovakia’s international image marks a turnaround in the 
way politics is conducted. However, Slovakia in 1998 was not facing stabilization in its 
party system or the decline of personalized politics, as we shall see in the following 
sections.
E. Final Period: 1999-2006
The final period to be examined here covers the developments from 1999 until 
just before the 2006 elections. Both the Czech Republic and Slovakia faced elections in 
2002, and in both cases the governments changed composition, but retained the leading 
parties. A new feature in the party systems of each state is also the elections to the 
European Parliament in 2004. Although thus far only the national elections to the 
legislative have been discussed, I will include some analysis from the results of the EP
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elections because it can be useful for projecting expected results of the next elections, 
which in both cases are expected in the summer of 2006. I will argue that this final 
period in the Czech Republic can be seen as the stabilization and consolidation of the 
political party system, but in Slovakia, consolidation of the party system is still far off, 
given the high degree of splinters and new party formations.
Stabilization o f the Czech System
The 2002 elections were contested by the same major parliamentary parties as 
competed in 1998, with the exception of the Four-Coalition. The member parties of 4K 
had formed a coalition within parliament as early as 1999, in order to fight the changes in 
the electoral system. In October 2001 US and DEU merged to form one party—US- 
DEU. However, in early 2002, an internal crisis ensued when KDU criticized ODA for 
not paying its debts, and ODA eventually left the coalition. The remaining parties, KDU- 
ČSL and US-DEU, formed the Coalition (Koalice), pooling their strength for the 2002 
elections. There were also internal changes within ČSSD, as Zeman was replaced as 
party leader by Vladimír Špidla, although Zeman remained prime minister until after the 
elections. While several new non-parliamentary parties formed on the right of the 
spectrum (including the Association of Independent Candidates, Sdružení nezávislých 
kandidátů, SNK), the left of the spectrum remained dominated by ČSSD and KSČM.
In the elections, the same four parties gained seats in the Chamber of Deputies, 
with ČSSD doing surprisingly well, considering the falling level of support throughout 
the previous government. ČSSD led the election with 30.2% of the vote, while ODS 
trailed with 24.5%. The
Coalition also faced disappointment, due in large part to its unstable electorate and 
unclear program. As a result of the open-list system, KDU-ČSL candidates constituted 
over two-thirds of the Coalition’s elected candidates, and US-DEU faced extinction 
(Cabada and Sane 2005, 142-3). Another surprise of the 2002 elections was the success 
of the Communist Party, which gained 18.5%, up over 7% from the previous election. 
KSČM was the only party to improve upon its 1998 performance. This might be 
explained by the role of KSČM as a protest party for those dissatisfied with the 
performance of the more mainstream left choice, ČSSD. The ČSSD-ODS opposition
71
agreement “left the Communist Party as the only serious option for those wishing to 
express their dissatisfaction with these signs of a party ‘cartel’” (Millard 2004, 147). 
None of the extra-parliamentary parties running received more than the needed 5% to 
enter parliament. Thus, the number of parliamentary parties decreased by one and 
ideological distance between them remained similar to previous elections.
Table 7 -  Results of the 2002 Czech Elections to Poslanec cá Sněmovna
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
CSSD 30.2% 70 35.0%
ODS 24.5% 58 29.0%
KSCM 18.5% 41 20.5%
KDU-CSL/US-DEU 14.3% 31 15.5%
Source: www.volby.cz
A Series o f Ill-Fated Governments
Although the party system can be considered in the process of stabilization, the 
stability of government cannot be (and was not) guaranteed. The Czech Republic saw 
three changes of prime minister between July 2002 and April 2005, all from ČSSD and 
without early elections. The coalition possibilities after the 2002 elections were again 
limited: a ČSSD-ODS grand coalition was refused outright. Špidla did not share 
Zeman’s respect for Klaus and the ODS and was unwilling to consider such an option. 
Cooperation with KSČM was also rejected as unacceptable by the majority of ČSSD 
deputies. ČSSD, KDU-ČSL, and US-DEU eventually formed a coalition with a bare 
majority (101 seats) and laced with ideological differences. Like the previous minority 
government, there were some within ČSSD who disagreed with this coalition, and the 
coalition agreement among the governing parties was less than stable (Cabada and Sane 
2005, 144). The conflicting ideological positions of the government parties made work 
on their program difficult: of the major goals set out by the government only those 
required by the EU for entry were able to pass. Even the two more rightist coalition 
members were unable to agree on some areas. Deputies from US-DEU were particularly 
unsatisfied with the coalition performance, and two deputies left the party (Dvořáková 
2004).
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The 2004 European Parliament elections were crucial for the fate of the Špidla 
government, especially the ČSSD and US-DEU. After a poor showing within the 
Coalition in 2002, the latter had feared that a poor showing in the EP elections would be 
the end of the party. It gained no seats in the EP and despite its continued presence in the 
government, is not expected to gain any parliamentary seats in the 2006 elections. The 
EP election results were also very disappointing for ČSSD. Špidla had tied his own fate 
to the EP elections, promising that if ČSSD did not perform well, he would resign from 
his position. ČSSD gained only 2 seats, far fewer than the ODS and even the KSČM. 
However, unlike the US-DEU, the ČSSD is still considered a major competitor in the 
2006 elections, so the EP elections were not nearly as detrimental to the ČSSD as to the 
Špidla government as such. After the elections, Špidla called for a vote of confidence 
within ČSSD and received only 66 votes of support, while the up-and-coming Stanislav 
Gross gained 106 votes of support (Dvořáková 2004). Špidla resigned as party leader 
and prime minister in August 2004 and Gross assumed the positions, becoming the 
youngest prime minister in Europe.
Table 9 -  Results ol the 2004 European Parliament Elections, Czech Republic
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
ODS 30.0% 9 37.5%
KSCM 20.3% 6 23.1%
SNK-ED 11.0% 3 12.5%
KDU-CSL 9.6% 2 8.3%
CSSD 8.8% 2 8.3%
Independents 8.2% 2 8.3%
Source: Dvořáková (2004)
The EP elections signaled another success for the KSČM, as it became the second 
largest representative, with 20.3% of the vote. While the KSČM has not completed 
reform, its participation in the European Parliament may bring it to into cooperation with 
international party organizations, and reform may be inspired from the outside. 
However, many of its votes were likely gained as a protest against the ČSSD during a 
particularly difficult time in its governance: unpopular public finance reforms were
underway, Špidla had been unable to connect with the electorate, and negative images of 
the party infighting were abundant in the mass media (Dvořáková 2004). A non-
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parliamentary rightist party which emerged in the previous electoral period also gained 
seats in the European Parliament—the Association of Independent Candidates-European 
Democrats (led by former ODS member Josef Zieleniec), SNK-ED.
The Gross government consisted of the same parties as under Špidla, ČSSD as the 
major coalition partner and KDU-ČSL and US-DEU as minor partners. This government 
also had troubles from its beginning. A new sentiment had risen within ČSSD that a 
more proper coalition partner would have been KSČM, leading to a divide within ČSSD 
between the pragmatic “third way” group (associated with Gross) and the more 
traditional leftist wing (led by Zdeněk Škromach) (Cabada and Šanc 2005, 146-7). 
However, the demise of the government was tied more personally to Gross and questions 
over his financial affairs, particularly an apartment and the real estate dealings of his 
wife. The scandals involving the prime minister drew criticism from the two coalition 
partners, who demanded Gross’s resignation. When the ČSSD conference in March 2005 
reaffirmed Gross’s leadership of the party, the KDU-ČSL left the governing coalition. In 
the following days, ODS initiated a vote of no-confidence, which failed due to the 
abstentions of the members of KSČM and US-DEU (ibid. 147). Gross resigned in late 
April and was replaced by Jiří Paroubek who continued with the same coalition as under 
Spidla, and managed to win back public support for ČSSD. Paroubek resembles Zeman 
in his pragmatism and charisma, and has been the first post-communist prime minister to 
open cooperation with the Communist Party (Handl 2005b). Partially because of this 
rapprochement, the Paroubek government has succeeded in holding together through the 
normal election period, at a time when many predicted a fall of the coalition and early 
elections (ibid. 15).
The 2000-2005 political system in the Czech Republic can be characterized by its 
lack of stable coalitions, and the relatively fast turnover of prime ministers. The same 
government coalition continued throughout the period, but it cannot be considered stable, 
as new negotiations took place after each change of leadership. Birch (2003) reminds us, 
however, that coalitions governments in some Western European countries take a long 
time to form and can be unstable, so even greater instability and difficulties in forming 
governments in the newly established democracies should be expected. In addition, as 
previously discussed, although the left has gained votes and power, it is still inhibited by
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the unreformed nature of the Communist Party, although with Paroubek, that has begun 
to change, however slightly. Unstable governments do not necessarily mean unstable 
parties, and the parties in the Czech Republic have remained fairly stable in terms of 
ideology, behavior and relative power.
Categorization o f  the Party System
After the 2002 elections, the Czech party system can be considered consolidated 
(Cabada and Sane 2005, 150). The ideological composition of the system remains stable 
with one major rightist party (ODS), the centrist KDU-ČSL, and a stable left comprised 
of ČSDD and the anti-system KSČM. Although the US-DEU may disappear after the 
next parliamentary elections, as a small center-right party, it may perhaps be easily 
replaced with a new parliamentary party (ibid.).
Using Wolinetz’s model, the tendency towards cross-ideological coalitions 
provides some insight on the shifting of party behavior, especially within KDU-ČSL and 
US-DEU. While in 1998, both parties had refused to support a ČSSD-led coalition, they 
each modified their stances in the following electoral periods. Each of these two parties 
entered a government led by an ideologically opposed party, although both smaller 
parties tend toward more centrist positions. For this period, KDU-ČSL and US-DEU 
tend towards more office-seeking parties, although KDU-ČSL also emphasizes policy. 
While ČSSD and ODS remain primarily vote-seeking parties, perhaps similar to the 
“catch-all party” model, aspects of office-seeking behavior characterized their actions 
from 1998-2005. ODS supported the ČSSD minority government, against its own 
ideology and policies, but in exchange for certain concessions and positions. ČSSD has 
been willing to accept support from the formerly antagonistic party. KSČM has remained 
throughout the time a mix of policy-seeking and vote-seeking, as it does not clearly 
delineate its program in order to attract a large electorate, but also maintains clear 
positions opposing aspects of the current system, attracting a protest vote.
Continued Instability in the Slovak Party System
The Slovak party system has been much more dynamic and unstable than the 
Czech system in the most recent time period. A new rightist government was formed in
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2002, led by many of the same individuals under different party names. Several major 
changes can be identified from 1999 until 2005: the rise of Direction (Smer), a new 
political party; the crisis of the Slovak left; and the split of the ruling SDK into two 
parties. At the same time, the role of the HZDS has decreased, making way for new 
challengers and signifying that the era of Mečiarism is coming to an end, but that 
populism still remains integral to Slovak politics. It is clear from the number of splits 
occurring in the most recent era that parties in Slovakia have not succeeded in anchoring 
themselves to coherent electorates and remain unstable, perhaps because o f the lack of 
left-right cleavages in society.
Table 8 -  Results of the 2002 Slovak Elections to Národná Rada
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
ĽS-HZDS 19.5% 36 24.0%
SDKU 15.1% 28 18.7%
Smer 13.5% 25 16.7%
SMK 11.2% 20 13.3%
KDH 8.3% 15 10.0%
ANO 8.0% 15 10.0%
KSS 6.3% 11 7.3%
Source: www.statistics.sk
As seen in Table 8, Mečiaťs HZDS (renamed ĽS-HZDS) again emerged with a 
plurality of votes, although smaller than in previous elections. However, a rightist 
government was formed consisting of the two successor parties of the SDK (SDKÚ and 
KDH) along with the SMK, and the newly formed Alliance of the New Citizen (Aliancia 
nového občana, ANO). This marked the second government led by Prime Minister 
Dzurinda. As in the 1998 elections, the 2002 elections ushered in several new parties 
while 3 parties from the previous term failed to enter parliament. The right-wing SNS, 
the leftist SDĽ, and Rudolf Schuster’s Party of Civic Understanding (Strana občanského 
porozumenia, SOP) all failed to overcome the 5% hurdle. The new parties in parliament 
were Smer, ANO, and the Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS).
The new political formation, Smer, founded by former SDĽ official Robert Fico 
in 1999 quickly gained public support with its anti-ideological “third way” stance. 
Within its first year, Smer gained 20% of public support, including a swath of former
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HZDS backers jaded by the party’s corruption and downfall. Fico claims that his party is 
non-ideological, and indeed, the party is difficult to categorize (Haughton 2002). 
Bugajski has called Smer’s stance a “populist position” which relies on “soft 
xenophobia” among its supporters (2002, 305). Smer has built itself on criticism of both 
the Mečiar and Dzurinda government, and attempts to connect with those who view 
themselves as losers of the recent economic reforms of the Dzurinda government.
Since the 2002 elections, and especially in the months before the 2006 elections, 
Smer’s orientation has become increasingly socialist. It has signed an agreement with the 
Slovak Trade Unions Confederation (Konfederácia odborových zväzov, KOZ) (“Smer 
Remains Ahead...” 2006). The party has also associated itself with the EU Socialist 
bloc: “Fico emphasised that Smer is very receptive to the Socialist faction attitudes and 
recognises them in the party's policies, adding that this connection will continue after the 
election.” (“Smer to Change Budget...” 2006). In the most recent public opinion polls 
prior to the 2006 elections, Smer was expected to win a plurality of seats, with over 30% 
of the vote (“Slovensku na prahu...” 2006). Smer’s increasing political popularity shows 
that traditional ideological cleavages, so important in Western Europe, are becoming 
somewhat more relevant as parties like HZDS and Smer align themselves with particular 
stances, but ideology is still less important than in Western Europe or the Czech Republic
While the Slovak communist successor party, SDC appeared rather successful in 
the 1990s with its reform efforts, and even participated in the SDK-led coalition, its days 
were numbered. Internal polarization between conservative socialists and modernizing 
elements was exacerbated by socio-economic hardships and the disappointment of the 
SDĽ electorate with the party and democracy in general (Handl and Leška 2005, 112). 
The departure of Robert Fico (the most popular SDĽ politician) and the formation of 
Smer marked the inability of the party to compromise with one if its largest factions, and 
Smer subsequently drew a fair amount of the former SDĽ electorate away from the party. 
Mikovič (2004) notes that further divisions became visible after the opposition called for 
a vote of no-confidence in the Dzurinda government in April 2000. This vote split SDĽ 
into a “hard-line” or radical socialist camp (led by chairman Josef Migaš, Pavol Koncoš 
and Ľubomir Andrássy) and the modernizing camp (represented by founder Peter Weiss, 
Brigita Schmógnerová, Milan Ftáčník, Pavol Kanis and others).
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The final split occurred just prior to the 2002 elections, when Weiss and Ftáčník 
formed the Social Democratic Alternative (Sociálne-demokratická alternative, SDA), 
which failed to gain seats in the 2002 elections. The remaining core of SDĽ also ran in 
2002, but received only 1.4% of the vote (Rose and Munro 2003). The Communist Party 
(KSS) also gained from the faltering of SDĽ. Although it had been around since 1992, 
representing the hardcore of unreformed communists, KSS had not gained a seat in 
parliament until the 2002 elections, when it captured 11 with 6.3% of the vote. Like 
HZDS, KSS is able to play upon populist rhetoric to gain support (Handl and Leška 2005, 
112). Thus, the SDĽ s position within party system was de facto  filled by Smer and KSS. 
However, they represent another step away from the consolidation of a left-right axis in 
Slovakia, playing rather on the Mečiar-anti-Mečiar divide {ibid.).
Not only did the left of the political spectrum have troubles prior to the 2002 
elections, but so did the rightist ruling coalition, SDK. This is perhaps more 
understandable as the SDK was formed from five different parties into one single party 
for the purpose of overcoming the obstacles thrown in the way by the Mečiar 
government. Discussions over the future of the SDK and KDH began almost as soon as 
the 1998 elections were over (Bučan 2004, 105). The major divide that formed within 
the SDK was between the Prime Minister, Dzurinda, the deputy leader of KDH and Ján 
Čamogurský, the KDH chairman. Like many other divides in Slovak politics, this one 
became a fight of personalities as much as politics. In January 2000, Dzurinda 
announced the formation of the Slovak Democratic and Christian Union (Slovenská 
demokratická a kresťanská únia, SDKÚ). The other member parties of the coalition 
retreated back to their pre-1998 forms. Only KDH’s representation had been affected by 
the split of SDK. Once again, a new party formed during the electoral period— SDK’s 
parliamentary seats were divided amongst the member parties, with SDKÚ gaining the 
largest share, followed by KDH, and the smaller members (DS, DÚ, SDSS and SZS) 
{ibid. 106). In the 2002 elections each of the former member parties of SDK ran 
separately, and the two largest splinters, SDKÚ and KDH, gained seats.
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Not even HZDS survived the pre-2002 election period without changes. In 2000 
the party reevaluated its platform,14 but that did not salvage its declining popularity. 
Mečiar’s popularity had been waning throughout the late 1990s, and by 2002-3 it hovered 
between 12 and 15% (Minarovič 2004, 51). As a reaction to entering the opposition in 
1998, the party began to reevaluate itself. In a conference in 2000, the party included in 
its name Ľudová Strana (People’s Party) to become ĽS-HZDS. Although the party’s 
website notes that the March 2000 conference opened a new chapter in its history as a 
center-right party, Minarovič argues that the program is not closely followed and that 
some articles since added mirror those of the pre-2000 party (2004, 43-4).
The lead-up to the 2002 elections saw more infighting within the party, and an 
attempt of the Mečiar-led center to retain power, particularly through last-minute 
manipulation of its candidate lists, which caused some of the most important and popular 
members to leave the party only two weeks before the elections (Minarovič 2002, 45). 
Ivan Gašparovič, a fervent Mečiar supporter and chairman of the parliament under 
Mečiar, broke away from HZDS and formed his own Movement for Democracy (Hnutie 
za demokraciu, HZD) in 2002. “Gašparovič's political views differed so little from 
Meciar's that his new party received an almost identical name, the Movement for 
Democracy (HZD), and espoused the same vague centrism that HZDS has long 
championed” (Williams 2004). Although the party won no parliamentary seats in 2002, 
Gašparovič triumphed over Mečiar in the 2004 presidential elections, in part due to the 
support Gašparovič gained from nationalist groupings and Smer (ibid.). The continuance 
of Mečiar’ HZDS in opposition in the 2002-2006 electoral period as well as Mečiar’s 
defeat may signal the decline of Slovakia’s most controversial politician, a sign that many 
welcome as a signal that the political system may begin consolidation soon.
14 The party website notes that from March 2000, it has begun a new chapter in its history— that o f a 
people’s party (Ľudová strana). In the subsequent elections, HZDS has contested under the name ĽS- 
HZDS (“História strany” at
http://www.hzds. sk/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=6&Itemid=28).
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Table 9 -  Results of the 2004 European Parliament Elections, Slovakia
Party Percentage of 
Votes
Number of Seats Percentage of 
Seats
SDKU 17.1% 3 21.4%
ĽS -HZDS 17.0% 3 21.4%
Smer 16.9% 3 21.4%
KDH 16.1% 3 21.4%
SMK 13.2% 2 8.3%
Source: www.statistics.sk
The European Parliament elections in Slovakia arguably played a less important 
role than in the Czech Republic, especially due to their extremely low turnout. Only 17% 
of voters participated in the 2004 elections, a result of what some have called “electoral 
fatigue” after two rounds of presidential elections and a referendum all in 2004 
(“Electoral Behavior...” 2004). Perhaps the low turnout was also due to a perception that 
none of the parties are stable enough to successfully represent voters’ needs. The EP 
elections saw no complete surprises, however, with four of the most popular parties 
gaining three seats and the Hungarian SMK gaining two.
The government formed by Dzurinda in 2002 initially had a majority of 78 seats. 
However, starting in 2004, the government began to falter, starting with the defection of 
ANO and several SDKÚ deputies from the coalition (Williams 2004), and ending with 
the fall of the government in early 2006 and the call for early elections. The first 
parliamentary challenge to the government came in July 2005, when Smer initiated a vote 
of no-confidence. There was not sufficient support for the movement and the Dzurinda 
government stayed in place. The governing coalition eventually collapsed after the 
resignation of 3 ministers: interior minister Vladimir Palko, justice minister Daniel Lipšic 
and education minister Martin Fronc, all of the KDH. Early elections are to be held on 
17 June 2006, three months earlier than originally scheduled.
Classification o f  Slovak Parties, 1998-2005
With the formation of three entirely new political entities, and numerous other 
splinters and changes in the Slovak party system during this time period, any 
consolidation of Slovak political parties is difficult to defend. The competition structures 
on both the right and the left make it difficult for parties to settle into a coherent program.
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The ideological shifting and ambiguity of parties like Smer and HZDS makes it difficult 
for other parties which might otherwise find an ideological niche in the system to settle 
and compete. Since 2000, however, both Smer and HZDS have enunciated ideological 
stances, a signal that after 8 years of a coherent rightist government, the parties and 
electorate are identifying with the left-right spectrum. It is quite clear that the right of the 
political spectrum consists of KDH, SDKÚ, and SMK, while KSS is certainly on the left. 
The positions of the other parties are more difficult. Smer could be placed on the center 
left, due to the abovementioned socialist leanings, and the self identification of most of its 
voters on the left or center (“Slovensko na prahu volebného roku” 2005, 6). However, a 
study published in 2005 by IVO asked party supporters to place themselves on the left- 
right spectrum. The results for ĽS-HZDS and SNS were quite interesting. ĽS-HZDS 
supporters placed themselves overwhelmingly in the center or left of the spectrum, with 
only 14% self-identifying as rightist. SNS, despite its extremist nature, finds the majority 
of its supporters identifying in the center and left of the spectrum (ibid.).
The “standard”/ “non-standard” model, on the other hand, has become somewhat 
less salient, as parties, even Mečiar’s HZDS, infamous for its manipulation of the system, 
have espoused more liberal democratic goals and methods. Thus the most relevant model 
for classifying the parties becomes the three-poled Wolinetz model. Smer and HZDS, the 
early favorites for the 2006 elections can both be considered vote-seeking parties. HZDS 
has consistently been classified as a vote- and office-seeking party because of its 
ideological ambiguity and reliance on various rhetorical streams. In its most current 
program ĽS-HZDS claims both Christian and socialist roots (“Politický Program, 
HZDS). Smer, though increasingly aligning itself with socialist goals, can also be seen as 
a vote-seeking party with elements of an office-seeking party, considering Fico’s 
statements that he will consider any alliance (“Smer Remains Ahead...” 2006). The 
other new party formed in the last period is the neo-liberal ANO, founded by Pavol 
Rusko, owner of the private Markíza television station. Newly formed parties can be 
difficult to categorize, as their priorities have not been settled (Wolinetz 2002, 161-2). 
However, the top-down structure and unstable electorate that characterize ANO lead to 
the preliminary classification as an office-seeking party. Shortly after joining parliament
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and the governing coalition, the party lost its importance after quarrels with coalition 
partners and left the government in 2005 (Diovcos 2004).
Of the former government parties, KDH can be seen as a policy-seeking party, 
which has had a very stable electoral base and Christian democratic program with 
minimal divisions since its founding (Diovcos 2004). Throughout the last electoral 
period, its priority on policies has become even clearer: “Thus, the party sets itself apart 
from other political parties and presents its opinions even at the cost of evoking a 
controversial social debate” (ibid.). The SMK, perhaps the most stable party in Slovak 
politics, remains an ethnic-based vote-seeking party, which combines several ideological 
and policy viewpoints to push for policies benefiting or sympathetic of the minority 
populations. Diovcos (2004) also notes that although differences of opinion exist in the 
party, the leadership knows the importance of maintaining a united outwards front, in 
order to continue pressing for change in their favor. The KSS during its first session in 
parliament was relatively isolated and can be considered a policy-seeking party.
Evaluation of the Party Systems, 1998-2005
Major divides
From 1998 to 2005, in the Czech Republic the economic and social axes of 
divisions remained the most relevant, as the two major political parties solidified their 
stances on either side of the divides. The “grand coalition” formed after the 1998 
elections indicates that policies are not always the highest priorities for the parties, and 
that they were willing to look past the differences in order to retain their power. The EU 
accession in May 2003 and the referendum on the constitution indicated that the national 
closure vs. cosmopolitan opening divide remains, with the ODS taking a Euro-skeptic 
stance, informed by President and former chairman Václav Klaus. ODS finds an unlikely 
ally in the KSČM, which has recently manifested aspects of liberal conservatism and 
Euroskepticism (Handl 2005a, 131). The rift between supporters and opponents of the 
previous regime remains relatively marginal, although the increasing presence of the 
KSČM may increase its salience with the voters. KDU-ČSL represents the most anti­
communist stance, along with ODS. Finally, the ethnic divide is not relevant to the 
political party system in the Czech Republic.
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In Slovakia, after the ouster of HZDS from the government, the economic and 
social divides have become more salient, particularly because of the liberal economic 
reforms passed by the Dzurinda governments. Smer finds its place on the economic 
social protectionist and social liberal alignment, while HZDS might be said to represent 
economic social protectionist and rather more social authoritarianism, although both 
parties are ideologically ambiguous. In place of the reformed SDĽ, the more orthodox 
KSS could represent a return of the divide between supporters and opponents of the 
communist regime. As mentioned, the SMK represents perhaps the most stable party 
within the Slovak system because of the steady importance given to the ethnic divide 
from the perspective of the minority. As in the Czech Republic, EU and NATO 
accession brought forth a struggle between national closure and cosmopolitan opening. 
The anti-Mečiar coalition supported a cosmopolitan opening and made membership in 
both organizations a top priority. The more populist HZDS remains more nationalist, and 
the continued presence of SNS around the 5% threshold indicates that this last divide is 
still relevant in Slovakia.
Classifying the System - Czech Republic
In the last period analyzed, the Czech party system saw almost no major shifts in 
the number and relative strengths of the political parties. The formation of a coalition 
among KDU-ČSL and US-DEU, and the subsequent decrease in importance of US-DEU 
counts as perhaps the most dramatic change, and considering US and DEU’s 
representation of only approximately 9% of the vote in 1998, and their status as new 
parliamentary parties in 1998, the loss of the parties cannot be considered as destabilizing 
for the system. All parliamentary parties can be considered relevant in this period, 
although KSČM’s relevance remained largely “blackmail” potential. KSČM is also the 
only party which continues to question the legitimacy of the regime, although its methods 
of pursuing its goals fall within the accepted standards of liberal democracy, including 
participation in the European Parliament, and as part of an international leftist 
organization. Above I classified the Czech system after the 1996 elections as a multi­
party system consisting of two larger parties and several smaller ones. The system 
continues to follow Ware’s model:
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The two largest parties are much larger than any of the others but neither of them 
can hope to obtain parliamentary majorities for themselves, and, moreover, post­
election coalition building will usually involve several of the smaller parties, and 
not just one of them. ... The leading parties stand for very different traditions, 
policies, or values which makes for intense rivalry between them, and that rivalry 
gives considerable leverage to the smaller parties in extracting concessions during 
the formation of coalition governments.
(Ware 1999, 166).
Ware’s description, based on Western European political systems, accurately describes 
the Czech party system as it has stabilized during the last two electoral periods. While 
the number of smaller parties will no doubt continue to fluctuate, and new parties can be 
expected to emerge as others fade away, the basic two-party dominance of the system 
will likely continue.
The ideological structure of the Czech system also remained fairly stable from 
1998 until 2005. On the left, the major player is the ČSSD, with the KSČM continually 
posing a problem for left-left coalitions. On the right side of the Czech political 
spectrum, ODS remains the dominant party. ODS, KDU-ČSL and US-DEU all belong to 
the liberal ideological stream. ODS and US-DEU are rather more conservative, while 
KDU-ČSL represents the Christian democratic view (Cabada and Šanc 2005, 152).
Despite the consolidation of other aspects of the party system, the extent of 
penetration of society by the political parties remains quite low. This does not 
necessarily indicate a failure of the system, but can increase future instability, as 
individuals do not feel attachments to parties and vice-versa, lowering the costs for the 
formation of new parties or splinters from the existing ones. Party membership in the 
Czech Republic, as in most post-communist states tends to be quite low and of the four 
major parties, only ČSSD reported increasing membership, but only by 5000 members 
(Mansfeldová and Kroupa 2005, 61, Table 3.1). In polls conducted by CVVM, around 
20% of the Czech electorate does not know or prefer any party. In another series of 
studies done by CVVM on the level of satisfaction with the behavior of political parties 
between 1998 and 2002, the level of dissatisfaction (number of respondents answering 
somewhat or very dissatisfied) was between 64% and 74% (“Reflexe stranického 
systému...” 2002). A 2006 study by the same institute found that most Czechs do not 
believe that the four parliamentary parties are able to solve problems efficiently (“Image
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politických stran” 2006). More generally, Czechs also seem to be dissatisfied with the 
political situation as a whole. While between 9 and 18% of respondents denoted they 
were satisfied or very satisfied with the political situation, between 46 and 57% were 
dissatisfied or very dissatisfied.15 Similarly, voter turnout has decreased in recent 
election years, as people become more dissatisfied with the political situation or simply 
withdraw into private life. (See Table 10).
Taking into account these factors, the Czech party system in the two most recent 
electoral periods is more difficult to classify according to Sartori’s model (Cabada and 
Sane 2005, 150). There is a moderate to high level of fragmentation as are the 
ideological distances among the parties. The KSČM continues to pose a problem for the 
classification of the party system, as it continues to represent an anti-system attitude and 
a leftist position that is quite far from that of the next closest party, ČSSD. The system 
can thus be classified between polarized multipartism and moderate multipartism using 
Sartori’s model.
Table 10 - Voter Turnout, Czech and Slovak Republics, 1990-2002






1994 (Slovakia) — 74.2%
1996 (Czech Republic) 75.8% . . .
1998 73.3% 83.5%
2002 58.7% 69.2%
Source: Rose and Munro (2003)
Classification o f the System -  Slovakia
Unlike the Czech party system, the Slovak party system cannot be considered 
consolidated or stabilized. Major changes in the relative strengths of parties within the 
system occurred in the last electoral period. These have been outlined above. While the 
previous electoral period saw the continuance of a multi-party system dominated by one 
party, the 1998 and 2002 elections changed the composition to a more equal multi-party
15 Compiled from CVVM analyses between May 2003 and June 2005. Complete results available at
www.cvvm.cas.cz.
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system, with several parties gaining between 10 and 20 percent of the vote, and several 
smaller parties.
The ideological structure and distance among parties remains difficult to 
characterize. However, two parties appear to be pursuing somewhat populist or anti­
ideology ends: HZDS and Smer. Despite their similar electoral appeals, the two parties 
are at odds and cannot be expected to participate. HZDS, reformed as ĽS-HZDS, claims 
a center-rightist position. Smer places itself on the left of the spectrum, is considered a 
replacement of the communist successor SDĽ, and has gained support from other 
European leftist parties.16 Smer is slotted to gain a plurality of votes of over 30% in the 
2006 elections, far outweighing its main competitors. As the final party on the left, the 
KSS has hovered around the 5% threshold for parliamentary seats throughout the pre­
election period. The Slovak right is somewhat more consolidated as SDKÚ-DS and 
KDH pursue traditional conservative and Christian democratic programs. KDH sees 
itself as the “oldest and most stable party in Slovakia” (KDH Program 2006), SDKÚ, led 
by Dzurinda, and the leading coalition partner until February, has lost some of its 
support, and has had similar public support levels to KDH. SDKÚ’s electorate seems 
fairly unstable, although it depends on “a high number of critical supporters, for whom it 
is a “common sense” option” (Diovcos 2004). The neo-liberal ANO that had formed part 
of the governing coalition imploded after its leader, Pavol Rusko, was ousted from the 
government. The salience of traditional right and left party identification appears to be 
increasing in Slovakia, and most parties seem to identify themselves with a particular 
position.
The extent of the penetration of parties by society remains somewhat low. Voter 
turnout has been decreasing (with the exception of the crucial 1998 elections), especially 
at the regional, local and EU levels. Party membership is quite low and people remain 
skeptical of parties and their role in society. According to a poll conducted by MVK in 
Slovakia in January 2006, 65% of the respondents had never been a member of any 
political party, but 71% of those surveyed also believed that party membership comes 
with advantages ordinary voters do not receive (“Party Membership Seen as Advantage”
16 Among the parties that have pledged support for Smer (and ČSSD) are Blair’s Labour Party and the 
European Socialist Party (“Blair gives Czech ally pre-election boost” (2006, March 13) Yahoo News. 
http://news.vahoo.eom/s/afp/200603IQ/wl uk afp/czecheupolitics 060310213032)
86
2006). As in the Czech Republic, public levels of trust in political parties are also quite 
low. In a November 2005 study by IVO, the only party with a level of trust higher than 
50% was Smer. The new Free Party was second with 36% of voters voicing their trust. 
The most distrusted parties were ĽS-HZDS and SDKÚ in which 76% of respondents 
voiced distrust (“Slovensku na prahu...” 2005). The Slovak polity thus has a low level of 
identification and loyalty towards political parties, indicating that the parties have failed 
to penetrate society.
The Slovak party system from 1998 to 2005 continues as system of polarized 
multipartism. The fragmentation, measured by the number of and relative strengths of 
the parties remains high and quite volatile. The enunciated ideological differences 
among the parties are also quite high. An example of the attempts of parties to 
distinguish themselves ideologically can be seen in the 2006 dissolution of the SDKÚ- 
KDH coalition government. After the fall of the coalition, the SDKÚ, which had 
previously aligned itself with Christian values began to assert a more neo-liberal stance, 
reaching out to a new electorate. Furthermore, Smer and HZDS have in recent years 
placed themselves on the left and center-right of the spectrum, indicating the increased 
salience of ideological position within Slovak politics.
Prospects for the Future
This paper was written during the months leading up to the 2006 elections and 
finished just prior to the elections in both states. Thus any prognosis for the future can 
only be limited. Furthermore, predictions based on public opinion data are difficult due 
to the unreliable nature of such data, the tendency for election results to differ 
significantly from polls published in the months before the elections, and the potential of 
opinion polls to affect, rather than reflect public opinion. However, I will cite public 
opinion polls as a means of indicating the support levels of the various parties in the 
months before the elections. This final section, then, should not be considered a 
prediction of what will happen in the election, but rather tentative projections for the 
party systems of the Czech Republic and Slovakia based on the preceding analysis, 
further developments within and among the parties during the pre-election period, as well 
as levels of support indicated in opinion polls.
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Let us begin with the Czech Republic. It is unlikely than any radical changes in 
the relative strengths of the parties or ideological structure of the system will take place 
in the near future. The system has been fairly stable since the 1998 elections. There will 
no doubt be the replacement of some minor parties with new parliamentary parties. One 
probable change on the left of the political spectrum is the rise of the Green Party (Strana 
zelených, SZ). In public opinion poll prior to the 2006 elections, SZ was expected to 
pass the 5% hurdle, which could bring a new potential partner into the picture on the left 
of the spectrum. The Green Party leadership has been rather ambiguous as to their 
potential coalition partners after the election, stating that it will cooperate with any party 
that does not depend on KSČM support (Alda and Skochová “Small parties...” 2006). If 
the party gains seats, there is a high chance that it could be asked by either of the largest 
parties to form a coalition.
It was mentioned earlier that the ideological distance between ČSSD and KSČM 
is greater than that between any other two parties in the Czech system. These differences 
have decreased and may continue to do so after the 2006 elections. ČSSD had not shown 
signs of willingness to cooperate with KSČM until late 2005, when Prime Minister 
Paroubek hinted at the possibility and engaged KSČM in cooperation on some 
legislation. While many in Czech politic and society at large view KSČM as totally 
unacceptable, ČSSD representatives (such as David Rath) have stated that they see it as a 
democratic party (ibid.). If the more pragmatic or traditional socialist streams within 
ČSSD gain power over the anti-communist left, then more cooperation and engagement 
with KSČM can be expected, although the possibility of a coalition still seems rather far 
off.
After the marginalization of US-DEU within the Coalition in the 2002 elections, 
US-DEU is expected not to re-enter parliament in 2006. The party is attempting to 
remake itself as a libertarian party through their Nové Unie svobody campaign, 17 but is 
not expected to reach 5% of the vote. Although SNK-ED (Association of Independent 
Candidates - European Democrats) gained some representation in the European 
Parliaments, public opinion polls do not show them as gaining more than the needed 5%. 
Thus a new contender on the right of the spectrum will most likely not emerge in the next
17 See the party’s website that follows its poster campaign: www.its-legal.us.
electoral period. The loss of US-DEU would not necessarily mean a large change in the 
competition structure, however, and might be compared to the situation of ODA after the 
1998 elections.
Changes in the number and relative strengths of parties as well as their ideological 
positioning can be expected in Slovakia. Smer has risen to become the most popular 
party in opinion polls, with support upwards of 30%, although many do not expect the 
final result to reflect such high numbers (Just 2006). Even so, Smer shows significantly 
higher support in polls than ĽS-HZDS, which shows support of up to 14%, and KDH, 
SMK or SDKÚ, all of which hover around 8-11% of the vote (“Volebné preferencie...” 
2006).
Two other party formations on the right of the spectrum could figure in the 2006 
elections. The first is the Slovak National Party (SNS) which lost its parliamentary seats 
in 2002. SNS has shown up to 9% support in polls. The second is the Free Forum 
(Slobodné fórum, SF), founded in 2004 by former SDKU members (led by Zuzana 
Martináková). SF attracts some former ANO voters and is expected to pass the 5% 
threshold. To this end, it has also added three non-parliamentary parties (DÚ, DSS and 
SZS) to its list in order to boost its support and gain seats (“Free Forum Ties Knot...” 
2006). The last party that may gain seats is the KSS, which also stands just above the 5% 
threshold. With such uncertainty, it is difficult to predict in which direction the Slovak 
polity will turn in June 2006. Smer has an advantage in that they have distanced 
themselves from both Mečiar and Dzurinda, as has SF and its smaller parties. If either of 
the extremist parties (SNS or KSS) gains parliamentary representation, it is likely that 
they will be isolated. Given the amount of volatility in the party system even in the past 
6 months or year, the Slovak party system cannot be considered stabilized, and the 
prospects for its stabilization even within the next electoral period are slim. This is also 
due to the fact that there are quite a few new parties to the system (as opposed to new 
parliamentary parties that have existed), and the parliamentary parties have experienced a 
high degree of splintering.
The extent to which parties penetrate Czech and Slovak society will most likely 
not change in the near future. Building trust and loyal electorates is a long-term process, 
and can be much more difficult with the skeptical electorate in the post-communist states.
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The mere fact that parties are more stable in the Czech Republic may led it to quicker 
penetration, however, deep penetration of society by parties does not occur in many 
democracies, so the process should not be taken for granted. Because of the frequency of 
splitting, disappearance and reformation among Slovak parties, deep connections 
between citizens and parties cannot be expected. In this case, the lack of connections is 
much more detrimental to the party system, as accountability and responsibility are 
uncertain and citizens may grow even more skeptical of parties and the political system 
as a whole.
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IV. The Special Case of the Communist Successor Parties
Within the study of post-communist party systems, the communist successor 
parties have gained a place as one of the most discussed phenomena, for several 
important reasons. The communist successor parties (CSPs)—the legal successors of the 
former ruling communist parties—found themselves in a very unique position after 1989. 
Unlike ruling parties in other types of non-democratic systems, the communist ruling 
parties, especially in bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes, had built extensive, rigid 
hierarchies. Loyalty to the party, its ideals, and the party structure had formed the basis 
for the government. The collapse of government in 1989 spelled the ouster of these 
parties from ruling positions, but not necessarily their demise altogether. This left the 
CSPs in a exceptional position. Though they were discredited in the eyes of the public 
and the democratic opposition, the CSPs retained resources unavailable to most emerging 
political parties and movements. They were often divested of financial resources, but 
retained other resources—especially extensive communication, mobilization, and 
outreach networks that spanned the country and reached otherwise disconnected areas.
The cases of the CSPs in the Czech and Slovak Republics are especially 
interesting because of the extremely different paths the parties took after the 1990 
elections. The two republic-level successors of the Communist Party o f Czechoslovakia, 
the KSČM and SDL, could hardly have turned out more different. The KSČM has 
remained a fairly orthodox communist, anti-system party, isolated by the rest of the 
parties, while SDC rapidly and decisively transformed itself into a modem leftist party, 
enabling it to cooperate with other parties and enter the government coalition before its 
disappearance. This short section will review the reform strategies of the two parties, and 
will attempt to show why they ended up so differently. It will also analyze how these 
differences in roles and structures of the CSP have affected the party system.
Initial Reform
Grzymala-Busse (2002) analyses the transitions of several communist successor 
parties in East Central Europe, including the KSČM and SD Ľ. She sets forth several 
requirements for the successful transition of a CSP into a modem left party. The
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transformation model is elite driven and focuses on three major transformation strategies: 
breaking with the communist past, centralizing the party organization, and rapid 
implementation of programmatic and policy reform (ibid. 9). Breaking with the past (by 
changing the name, cleansing the party of pre-1989 radicals, and acknowledging the 
failures of the past regime) is important for the parties to be able to regain credit and 
thereby become an accepted player in the system. Centralization, is key because it puts 
control of the party in the hands of elites, facilitating change. It also denotes the party’s 
ability to respond to voter preferences, compete in campaigns and promote party 
discipline in parliament. Finally, “early, rapid, and decisive” transformation of the 
program and policy in line with the mainstream leftist parties must follow organizational 
reforms (ibid.).
The Czech KSČM, 1989-1993
According to Grzymala-Busse’s analysis, the KSČM’s transition failed to fully 
centralize and break with the past, two steps that might have caused a shift toward a more 
central-left or social democratic stance. After November 1989, the KSČ in the Czech 
Republic adopted some transition strategies, but overlooked others. For example, 
although it requested the pre-1989 leadership to leave party ranks, it did not require their 
resignation. In the subsequent Central Committee elections of October 1990, 48 of 109 
members were party leaders from before 1989, who continued to exercise power over 
party decisions (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 84). The party also did not require members to 
reregister. Conservative factions within the party pushed for further decentralization to 
give local party organizations even greater power, as this level consisted of the most 
conservative members (many of whom were “normalizers” of the post-1968 period) (ibid. 
84-5). During the first electoral period (1990-1992), heated debates over the future of the 
party took place between modernizing, reformist elements within the party and the 
conservative, orthodox Leninist members. The dominance of the latter caused early 
reforms to be reversed, and sealed the KSČM’s fate as an unreformed communist party.
These conservative elements also played a role in the failure of the KSČM to 
break with the past. Until 1993, the party retained much of its reading of history, 
continuing to see the decades of communism as a positive developmental force for
92
Czechoslovakia, although it apologized for the 1968 (Shafir 2000, 4). Of more symbolic 
importance was the debate over the name of the party. While other parties in the region 
sought to quickly change their names to reflect more modem, democratic views, the 
Czech party held a referendum in which 76% of voters chose to keep the communist 
name, changing only the regional signifier: Komunistická Strana Československa (KSČ) 
to Komunistická strana Čech a Moravy (KSČM).
The final factor in transformation is the party program. Handl notes that it is 
difficult to classify the programmatic changes within KSČM; while they obviously opted 
for a “strategy of leftist retreat,” the program cannot be identified as strictly orthodox or 
neo-communist (2005a, 129-30). Handl also argues that the program has been quite 
malleable over the years of development. The early transformation of the party was 
somewhat based on models from other European hard-left parties (such as the Italian 
PCI), but also retained much of the Marxist-Leninist ideology and rhetoric, familiar from 
the pre-1989 party {ibid. 131, 134-5). Still, some aspects of the KSČM’s program are 
unheard of in mainstream European leftist parties.18
The “survival strategy” of KSČM seems to have served it well in the first few 
years of transformation, as the party remained one of the most stable (in terms of votes) 
in the system. KSČM gained 13% of the vote in 1990. In 1992, the party dominated the 
Left Block coalition of leftist parties, which gained 14%. Although the KSČM agreed to 
“play by the rules” of democratic competition, it is considered an anti-system party 
because its program rejects the capitalist and liberal democratic system in favor of an 
ambiguously defined socialism.
The Slovak SDĽ, 1989-1993
During the first post-communist elections in June 1990, the KSČ officially ran as 
one party, although the Slovak Communist Party had gained autonomy from the Czech 
party before the elections. KSČ won a similar share of the vote in Slovakia as in the 
Czech lands—just over 13%. Despite the common bid for elections, the transformation
18 Perhaps the most striking example o f  the communist orthodoxy of the KSČM’s program is its policy 
towards communist-led states. The party openly admires states such as North Korea and Cuba. In 1992-3, 
the orthodox wing of KSČM, led by Miroslav Stěpan, took inspiration from the North Korean model 
(Grzymala-Busse, 2002, 89).
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of the Slovak party had begun as early as November 1989, when a new Action 
Committee was formed of reformist members of the Marxist-Leninist Institute. These 
individuals (especially Peter Weiss) were young and heavily reform-minded, and thus 
were able to form a strong elite base for the transformation and modernization of the 
party (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 93). With reformers in place at the head, the Slovak party 
was able to rapidly centralize the leadership, break with the past and amend the program. 
Weiss, the new leader of the party commented at the time: “either we will quickly and 
thoroughly change the ideology, organization, and obviously, the name, to a modem left 
party with its own original identity [or we] will then change into a sect, which will lose 
real influence in society” (Weiss in Pravda, 25 January 1990 quoted in Grzymala-Busse 
2002, 95).
Crucial to the success of the party transformation was the re-registration of all 
members in the fall of 1990. Although the membership decreased to 45,000 (from over 
400,000), many young members who favored reform were retained, contributing to the 
impetus for change (ibid. 96). Remaining conservatives within the leadership of the party 
were also eliminated by 1991, and some formed the more orthodox but less influential 
Communist Party of Slovakia (KSS). Unlike the KSČM, the new SDĽ kept conservative 
former members from returning after the first elections. This prevented any retreat to 
orthodox views and aided SDL’s ability to break with the past, respond to voters and 
amend its program.
“It is telling that while reformists in the KSCS were pushed outside the party's 
ranks, in Slovakia conservatives ended up leaving the SDĽ” (Shafir 2000, 3). Clearly, the 
lack of a strong elite-driven transformation in the Czech party deeply influenced its lack 
of clear, decisive reforms. On the other hand, in Slovakia, the more dynamic and 
reformist elites who rapidly took control of the party succeeded in cutting it off from the 
past and communist orthodoxy.
The Next Two Electoral Periods, 1993-2000 
KSČM Stagnation
After the breakup of Czechoslovakia, KSČM continued to play a small but 
important role in Czech politics. As mentioned in previous discussions of the ideological
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structure of the Czech party system, KSČM occupies a significant place on the left. 
Because of its radical positions on some issues, the distance between it and the Social 
Democratic party is large. In the three elections between 1993 and 2000, KSČM 
continued as a parliamentary party, albeit an isolated one. 1993 marked the return of the 
neo-Stalinist Miroslav Štěpán to the party after serving time in prison for his reactions to 
the demonstrations of November 1989. This meant an even more decisive triumph of 
conservative elements over reformists. The leader of the reformist wing, Jiří Svoboda 
resigned. Štěpán was eventually expelled from the party and set up his own radical party 
in 1999 (Shafir 2000, 4-5). The dominance of the conservatives was further ensured by 
leader of the party, Miroslav Grebeníček, a centrist who depended on the support of the 
conservative wing to remain in power (Handl 2005b, 7).
In spite of the dominance of the conservatives, the party continued to gain a 
modest portion of the vote throughout the 1990s. Where does its support come from? 
The party relies on its members for votes, and communist voters appear to be quite loyal. 
Membership in 1989 was around 1.25 million, but has been decreasing ever since, with 
200,000 in 1992 and 125,000 in 1999 (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 82). The membership base 
is rather unstable, especially because of the large proportion of elderly members 
(according to Handl, in 2003, the average age of KSČM members was 68) (2005a, 131). 
Increasingly, the party relies on non-members—Handl also notes that the ration of 
members to non-members voting for KSČM in 1990 was 1:2.5, while in 2002 it was 1:7 
(2005b, 6). The lack of a clear program and anti-system nature of KSČM in this era 
means that many of its votes from non-members were likely protest votes, especially in 
the aftermath of the 1997 financial scandals over privatization. Having distanced itself 
from privatization, KSČM gained 11% of the vote in 1998. The party continues to rely 
on its position as a protest party, a strategy which has perhaps even increase its 
representation. However, during this period the party continued to be ostracized by other 
parties in the parliament and had no hope of joining a government.
SDĽ Participation in Government
The SDĽ gained a significant share of the votes in the 1992 elections. Grzymala- 
Busse notes that in the scramble for power in the Slovak parliament, “both sides of the
95
political cleavage sought SDĽ as a coalition partner” (2002, 245). As a result of its 
reform, the party was in a position to unite with the rest of the opposition in a move 
against the HZDS-SNS government to push for early elections in 1994. The move was 
successful and the SDĽ served in the short coalition government with the Christian 
Democratic Union. This cooperation with a rightist party led to the loss of some of the 
loyal electorate (ibid. 203). In 1994, the SDĽ, like its Czech counterpart, contested the 
election as the leading member of a coalition—Common Choice (Spoločná voľba, SV). 
However, as Handl and Leška note, the SDĽ leadership “overestimated the party’s 
supporter base” and gained only 10.4% of the vote in 1994 (2005, 111;). Another factor 
that may have contributed to this loss was the formation of the ZRS by former SDĽ 
deputy Ján Ľupták in March 1994, which gave voters a socialist-communist alternative 
(Bugajski 2002, 310). ZRS gained 7.3% of the vote.
During this period, the SDĽ proved that programmatically, it was also a 
mainstream European leftist party. It took inspiration from Socialist International, and 
the Party of European Socialists and found its place amidst European soft-left parties: 
“The political programme of 1996 was particularly important as it established the 
programmatic compatibility of SDĽ with Western social democracy” (Handl and Leška 
2005, 116). At the same time, however, the 1996 replacement of reformist chairman 
Peter Weiss with Jozef Migaš brought to the front the more conservative socialist wing of 
the party, and caused tension within the party “to such an extent that the conservative 
socialists often attacked their own government in parliament” (Handl and Leška 2005, 
112). Grzymala-Busse argues that the party also faced difficulties maintaining a stable 
electorate: “ ...the party’s support remained narrow both because its candidates could not 
convincingly articulate their message and because the party changed its addressed 
constituency from year to year” (2002, 204).
The SDĽ regained its lost votes in the 1998 elections, helped by the discreditation 
of the ZRS within the controversial Mečiar government, and its own efforts to 
demonstrate its commitment to democracy (Grzymala-Busse 2002, 248). It again 
received 14.7% of the vote and was invited to join the left-right (anti-Mečiar) ruling 
coalition. In spite of this success, the party had been rife with internal struggles since the
1994 elections. SDL had managed to reform and become part of mainstream politics, but
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the selfsame reform created internal tension that contributed to the eventual splintering of 
the party.
The Final Period, 2000-2005: KSČM Stability, SDĽ Decline
The period before and after the 2002 elections marks a somewhat ironic twist in 
the lives of the Czech and Slovak CSPs. The party more successful in transforming itself 
into a mainstream leftist party disappeared from the political scene while the outdated, 
unreformed party even increases its reputation without significant reform or 
programmatic turnaround. This seems to defy Grzymala-Busse’s hypothesis regarding 
the conditions for success of communist successor parties.
It has been shown that the KSČM’s strategy of adopting a hard-line stance 
towards capitalism and the system courted some of the frustrated electorate. Frances 
Millard has drawn attention to this strategy: “Though seeking recognition as a ‘normal 
political party’, in parliament the KSČM remained largely isolated. However, in 2002, 
the communists’ role as the ‘party of protest’ gained them some 18 per cent of the vote” 
(2004, 57). Perhaps paradoxically, the KSČM has found that the status as a protest party 
gains them electoral support despite their practical isolation within parliament. Yet 
programmatic reform is also visible: Handl notes a “dramatic shift to social democracy” 
while maintaining a social revolution at the core of its identity (2005b, 5-6). The party’s 
2002 success may also have been helped by “the one-dimensional form of party 
competition evident in the Czech Republic”—the economy (Handl 2005a, 130).
A further success for the party were the 2004 European Parliament elections, in 
which it gained 6 seats to become the second largest Czech party in the EP. Within the 
context of the EP, the KSČM has joined the GUE-NGL working group, which could 
contribute to its adapting policies from Western European far-left parties. But the 
conservative wing of the party still retains a negativist, Euro-skeptic attitude, putting it 
more in line with President Klaus and the ODS than with other leftist parties. 
Programmatically and in terms of its behavior, the KSČM remains an anomaly in Czech 
politics. Although the strict isolation within parliament is thawing, the change is slow 
and gradual, reflecting a high level of distrust even after 16 years. The KSČM is 
expected to gain a slightly lower percentage of the vote than it currently has, so it will
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most likely remain a player within the government. As much depends on the
development of relations between KSČM and ČSSD as on internal developments within
the Communist Party.
The widespread programmatic reform carried out by the SDĽ in the late 1990s
also raised latent tensions within the party. Two primary groups arose within SDĽ,
conservative socialists and modernizers:
The main body of the party was able to live with the ‘democratic 
socialism’ of the Western social-democratic and socialist left of the late 
1980s and early 1990s. It became alienated, however, by the shifts in the 
socio-economic programme and the policies of those advocating a ‘third 
way’, as well as by security issues, such as NATO enlargement, which the 
party’s modernizers endorsed. (Handl and Leška 2005, 122)
The splintering of SDL reflected this division. The various factions that emerged from 
SDC were described in Section III.E, but a brief review will illustrate this point. The first 
split occurred in 1999 when Robert Fico left to form Smer, a populist social democratic 
party, which has increasingly become the favorite in public opinion polls before the 2006 
elections. With the support of the trade unions and a strong anti-Mečiar, and anti- 
Dzurinda rhetoric, Smer claims to represent the “third way.” The modernizing elements 
of the party (led by Weiss) formed SDA, while the conservative non-communist social 
democrats contested in 2002 as SDL. Of rising importance was the Communist Party of 
Slovakia, a group of hard-line communists that were forced to leave the party in 1990 and 
had never gained parliamentary representation. Thus of the many leftist formations that 
entered the elections in 2002, only Smer and KSS managed to gain seats in parliament. 
These two parties de facto  replaced SDL, although they do not at all resemble SDĽ or its 
policy goals.
The Role o f  CSP Development in Party System Development
It can be said, then, that the differences in development in the Czech and Slovak 
CSPs were caused primarily by decisions made in the first few years of transformation. 
The stagnation of KSČM as a conservative communist and anti-system party was visible 
as early as 1993, when orthodox elements gained control of the party and early reforms 
were toppled. Although the possibility for reform is still there, it is doubtful that the
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party would survive drastic reform, if it took place at all. The Slovak party, on the other 
hand, quickly and decisively revamped its image, ideology, and policy, gaining both 
support and a place in the government. Precisely this reform, however, led to 
factionalization of the party and its downfall.
How did these two parties in turn affect the party systems within which they 
operated? The Czech party, it can be argued, used the resources available (large 
membership, local-level networks, established party newspaper) to maintain its 
ideological position even after communism had been discredited. The unchanged 
ideological position caused (and continues to cause) troubles for the Czech left, 
significantly reducing the space for competition on the left of the spectrum. This perhaps 
helped the formation of the rather unstable minority and then left-right governments that 
have characterized Czech politics since 1998. Although it still carries an underlying anti­
system ideology, the KSČM does not seem to pose a threat of the return of communist 
totalitarianism, although its ideological position helps contribute to the instability of the 
political system. Within the party system, KSČM has remained a stable small party. 
Nevertheless, it relies on the protest vote, meaning that its support base is unstable.
On the other hand, the Slovak SDĽ established a firm place for itself as a 
modernized, social democratic party, in line with similar parties in Western Europe. In 
this sense, it utilized some of its resources, but eschewed others, such as the large 
membership base (which it decreased through re-registration). It became the major 
player on the left side of the political spectrum, as is the case with CSPs in other post­
communist countries. The dissolution of the SDĽ also spelled the destabilization of the 
Slovak left, with several different parties cropping up in its place. The de facto 
replacement of SDĽ by KSS and Smer may cause the Slovak left to resemble the Czech 
left, with the presence of a social democratic party that is not a communist successor and 
an extremist communist party.
The major influence that the CSPs have had on their respective party systems has 
been through affecting the ideological structure and thus the structure of competition 
within the system. Although their influence has probably not been stronger than other 
medium-sized parties, they provide an interesting point of analysis because of their 
unique position as former ruling parties with greater access to resources. The party
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which utilized its resources to remain a conservative communist bastion has maintained 
its place within the party system, but the party that remade itself as a mainstream social 
democratic party faced its eventual collapse.
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V. Conclusion
In the section on theory, I argued that political party systems are a crucial aspect 
of evaluating the consolidation o f democracy. Integral to such an evaluation are the 
number and size of parties in a system, the change or volatility within the system, the 
extent to which parties penetrate society, and the presence of anti-system parties. In the 
subsequent sections I described the development of the political party systems in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics since the fall of the communist regime in 1989. Along with 
the descriptions, I have attempted to analyze the developments considering these four 
major factors, as well as an overview of the types of political parties present, according to 
ideology and behavior (using Wolinetz’s model).
The general conclusion is that the system of political parties in the Czech 
Republic is characterized by stability among the major parliamentary parties, the 
presence of a somewhat influential anti-system party, and somewhat irregular coalition 
building. I agree with earlier conclusions (Cabada and Sane 2005) that the Czech party 
system is consolidated, although the interactions among parties as well as the low 
penetration of society, especially in government-forming do not indicate a fully stabilized 
political system. The situation in the Slovak Republic is somewhat different. Although 
as of the 2002 elections, the major political players appear to have accepted democratic 
norms, the party system cannot be considered consolidated for several reasons. From the 
point of view of the number and strength of the parties, there is still quite a high level of 
volatility with new parties or party formations cropping up before each election. 
Ideological positioning is just beginning to solidify, although it is unclear whether parties 
will reach a higher level of penetration in society.
This study has explored several different factors that contribute to the 
development of party systems and their differences. In the case of the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, some factors have been more important than others in determining the shape 
and structure of the party systems in the first 15 years of democratization. One factor that 
has been quite important in contributing to differences in the party systems is the 
structure of socio-political divides within the country, loosely referred to as the “cleavage
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structure.”19 Social and political divisions also contribute to the ideological positions 
taken by parties. Of underlying importance for the initial structure of the party systems 
have been the institutional decisions made at the outset of democratization. Finally, 
historical experience may be a mitigating or aggravating factor in party system 
development. The only variable within party systems that does not seem to influence 
democratic consolidation is party type.
Cleavages
Despite their original existence as one country there have been considerable 
differences in their development, both during the Czechoslovak era and as separate 
republics. These differences can be explained through a number of means. One is the 
different cleavages that have existed in each society. The cleavage structure determines 
which issues are most salient for society, and in turn which issues politicians pick up in 
their bids for office. Whether or not these are the most pressing in terms of successful 
democratization is not always of primary concern, and indeed the importance of certain 
cleavages, especially ethnic divides can be harmful to a country.
While the predominant cleavages that have been important in the Czech Republic 
have been economic and social, Slovak society has struggled with ethnic divisions, 
nationalist/cosmopolitan, as well as a specific cleavage over personality and the conduct 
of politics (Mečiarism/anti-Mečiarism). The nature of the cleavages in Slovak society is 
not necessarily conducive to productive discussion of democracy and its consolidation. 
Rather, nationalism and Mečiarism can be seen as forces which drove back democracy, 
especially between 1994 and 1998. Economic and social cleavages have a growing 
importance in Slovak politics, especially with the recession of Mečiarism. It remains to 
be seen, however, if the establishment of economic and social divides will lead to 
stronger, more durable political parties and a consolidated party system.
19 I use the term “cleavages” more generally than Lipset and Rokkan (1967), to describe divisions or lines 
along which political society is divided. This does not imply a deep history and formation. However, it is 
possible that as years go by these divisions will indeed become cleavages in the sense meant by Lipset and 
Rokkan. Freezing along these lines could be possible, especially in the context o f the Czech Republic, 
where parties (and democracy) seem to be much more stable and consolidated than in the Slovak Republic. 
However, it is difficult to imagine the same type o f development o f cleavages in post-communist Europe as 
occurred in pre-war Western Europe.
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In contrast, internal ethnic divisions have hardly entered the political discussion in 
the Czech Republic. Scandals that disrupted the government were more likely to fall 
along economic or financial lines, as in 1997 and 2005. The clearest socio-political 
divisions are economic and social, and the rhetoric of the major parties follows these 
lines. Causation is not necessarily one directional: the Czech system may be consolidated 
because the primary dividing lines are economic and social, or the reverse may be true. It 
is likely that causation occurs in both directions, and certainly other factors also play a 
role.
Institutional decisions
Like cleavages, institutional decisions have an important effect on the structure of 
the party system. The main institutional structures of the government and the party 
systems in both the Czech Republic and Slovakia have remained fairly stable, while 
minor changes have been common. The original decisions for proportional 
representation in both states likely boosted the formation of multi-party systems. The 
minor changes have involved electoral law: particularly district magnitude, thresholds 
and seat allocation formulas. These changes have had a much more muted effect, except 
for the most drastic changes that took place around the 1998 elections—most of which 
were subsequently reversed. Thus we can say that institutional decisions had an effect at 
the beginning of party development. Since there have not been any drastic alterations in 
institutional design, the structures of the systems have been stable in that they have not 
shifted from multipartism to bi- or single-partism, or other such drastic changes.
Historical experience
Historical experience plays a much smaller role than the previous factors, but the 
differences between the Czech and Slovak Republics under communist rule cannot be 
ignored. Because the communist rule in Slovakia after 1968 was not as harsh and 
oppressive as that in the Czech Republic, the post-communist divide between supporters 
and opponents of the regime was not as strict, allowing former (moderate or reformist) 
communists to play a role in the post-communist regime. This may have increased the 
likelihood of semi-authoritarian tendencies in Slovakia. This is especially true of the
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Mečiar governments, under which the country more closely resembled post-communist 
states where the communist leadership reformed and remained in power (i.e. Bulgaria and 
Romania) than the imploded former regime in the Czech lands. Historical experience 
cannot be considered a main cause, but should rather a secondary reason leading to the 
more prominent role of former communists in the political life of Slovakia than the Czech 
Republic.
Types o f parties
Throughout the analysis, I attempted to categorize the political parties according 
to ideology and to a three-pronged model based on Wolinetz (2002). The model was 
developed for Western European parties, but was applicable in most cases to the post­
communist parties. Party type seems to be a variable that does not have much or any 
influence over the development of the party systems in the Czech and Slovak Republics. 
In each time period analyzed, at least two types of parties were identified, and in many 
cases parties showcase qualities of more than one party type. It cannot be said that a 
government consisting primarily (or even exclusively) of policy-seeking, or vote-seeking, 
or office-seeking parties will be more conducive to democracy. Indeed, there is no 
relation between party type and democratic stability even in established democracies. 
There will most likely continue to be all three types of parties in the Czech and Slovak 
system and parties can be expected to change priorities as the system, the society, and 
their own needs develop.
One aspect of party system type that does appear to be important for 
democratization is the stance of the parties towards the regime. Although anti-system 
parties in the Czech Republic and Slovakia are not an outward threat to the regime 
(because of their relatively low support), they can cause troubles for stable party 
interaction and competition. The clearest example is that of the Czech Communist Party.
The Consolidation o f  Democracy
Many have speculated on the consolidation of democracy in these two states and 
an analysis of the party system exclusively cannot provide a definitive evaluation. 
However, if a competitive, institutionalized, and consolidated system of political parties
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is an integral part of democratic consolidation, then the evaluations of democracy in the 
Czech and Slovak Republics will reflect the above assessment of their respective party 
systems. From the party politics perspective, then, the Czech democracy is well on its 
way to a consolidated democracy, marked by the competition and fairly stable nature of 
its party system. Slovakia somewhat lags behind. Despite the progress it has made 
economically in the past two electoral periods, its party system is not well-entrenched or 
consolidated. From this point of view, neither is Slovak democracy. This is quite 
obviously a one-sided appraisal of democracy. Nevertheless, hopefully it has become 
apparent how important political parties and the party system are to fully-functioning 
democracy. Continued observation and analysis of these aspects of the new democracies 
in Central and Eastern Europe will be crucial to further study of democracy in this region.
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